LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD
Reflections on Urban Regime Analysis

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In differentiating urban regime analysis from pluralism, this article argues that the politics of bringing together governing arrangements poses challenges that are much greater than the "retail" politics of pressuring government officials regarding particular decisions. Agenda setting, coalition building, resource mobilization, and devising schemes of cooperation are central elements in a model of governing. Seen in structural context, particularly of the system of social stratification, these elements in combination can explain why it is so difficult to give priority to policies to overcome social exclusion. Furthermore, because the impact of social-reform initiatives depends greatly on how governmental actions mesh with nongovernmental actions, sustained efforts depend on contributions from nonelites as well as strategic supports from elites.

Keywords: *urban regime; agenda; democracy; purpose; social exclusion; political agency*

This effort to assess urban regime analysis[1] is a personal one. The concept of an urban regime has had many architects and has taken many forms. I speak here only about my own understanding of the concept and how this understanding continues to evolve. My thoughts have been influenced by looking back at questions raised since the concept came into use, but I have also tried to think about where research might fruitfully go in the future.

Below I address four topics:

- how urban regime analysis differs from pluralism;
- the inadequacies of elite engagement as a focus for research;

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- the role of selective incentives in relation to ideas and especially to purpose; and
- the place of urban regime analysis in a broader landscape of theory.

PLURALISM

Fragmentation is a common complaint about the contemporary world. Functional specialization has proceeded far, and we live in times in which no ruling group runs the show. Does this mean that in some sense we are all pluralists (Judge 1995, 30–32)? I would say that the answer is yes *only* if one defines pluralism loosely as the absence of rule by a cohesive elite. However, something more stringent than that is needed if the term is to be useful in political analysis.

Concerns about concept stretching might be directed toward pluralism and its many variants—“hyper,” “neo,” “bounded,” “truncated,” “two-tiered,” “stratified,” and more. Here, I propose to equate pluralism with the classic understanding put forward by the Yale school and its strong kinship with the work of David Truman.[2] The central idea, and the one I wish to challenge explicitly, is that universal suffrage turns politics into an open and penetrable process, yielding to those who become active around particular interests salient to them.[3]

Dahl (1961) saw people as largely concerned with things that are typically apolitical. Yet and still, he argues, where there are basic civil liberties and reasonable transparency in the conduct of public affairs, popular control is a reality. The ballot box countervails wealth and social status, and the fragmentation of a highly differentiated society further assures that political inequalities are dispersed. In Dahl’s eyes, a great leveler is that people are concerned mainly with matters close at hand. People guard their immediate interests, and the centrifugal force of this pattern assures that no group is in a position to accumulate wide control over others. Coalitions are unstable and realign as issues shift with changing times and conditions. Furthermore, no group is confined to the position of permanent political exclusion.[4]

Although pluralism captures aspects of political reality, it is fundamentally flawed.[5] That assessment separates urban regime analysis from classic pluralism, but given that several scholars have equated regime analysis with pluralism,[6] I want to be explicit about the differences between the two schools of thought. Whereas *Who Governs?* (Dahl 1961), for example, explains what would make politics open and penetrable, urban regime analysis looks in a different direction to explain why politics is mainly accessible to those who can meet substantial threshold tests.

The axial issue between classic pluralism and urban regime analysis is about elections and whether control of elected office is the center point around which politics rotates.[7] We need not revisit here all of the reasons why the vote is a limited instrument of popular control, but I want to underscore the point that, even if ideal conditions existed so that citizens were able to exercise rigorous oversight of all top officials through an ample array of ballot choices, the authority of government has only a limited writ. Standing alone, government is by itself an inadequate problem solver. Public policy impacts (and therefore public policies) depend on complementary actions from nongovernmental sources. At best, electoral accountability reaches only part of the process of shaping public policy, and for that part, electoral accountability is in reality very far from being a robust process.

I will elaborate this point below, in the discussion of the inadequacy of the elite engagement, but for now, I will simply direct readers to valuable insights, in particular those of Michael Brown (1999) on AIDS prevention as an illustration of how important civil society remains as a contributor to problem solving.[8] And one should not overlook a long-standing tenet of urban political economy, namely, that government must achieve an accommodation with those who control the levers of economic activity. The accommodation may occur more at the national than the local level, but even in the social welfare democracies of Scandinavia, accommodation is a political reality, and it is one that voters, as a stand-alone force, are ill positioned to influence, much less control (Rokkan 1966).

A second divide separates urban regime analysis from pluralism. In classic pluralism, all issues take shape on the same plane. Immediacy of concern is a pervasive condition, with centrifugal forces therefore dominant. Big issues require a wide, but inevitably unstable, coalition. In narrow issue arenas, David is fully capable of slaying Goliath, or in Dahl's New Haven, Mary Grava can defeat city hall (1961, 192–97). The same principle of dispersed inequalities prevail in all questions, large and small.

From Bachrach and Baratz's "Two Faces of Power" (1962) onward, critics have challenged pluralism with a counterargument that politics is waged on multiple levels.

In the preface to *Regime Politics*, I quoted "Big Jim" Folsom, governor of Alabama in a past era: "Nothing just happens. Everything is *arranged*." Politics, I went on to argue, is "the art of arranging" (1989, p. xii) and at its heart is the capacity to structure the relationships through which a community or society is governed. That capacity is not widely dispersed, and it is different from a short-term and narrowly focused effort to influence a particular policy decision.[9] In an earlier article (Stone 1982), I argued,

> Just as the economy involves more than buying and selling consumer goods, so the polity involves more than the pressures and counterpressures on discrete policy choices. Decisional politics is, in a manner of speaking, the politics of the consumer market, not the politics of investment and production. And, to continue the analogy, expending time and resources on particular substantive decisions is often a low-return form of political activity. The return is higher if one can invest in creating or maintaining arrangements. (p. 276)

The capacity to build, modify, or reinforce governing arrangements requires resources and skills that are not widely available. Inequalities in that capacity are substantial, systemic, and persistent—qualities that run counter to classic pluralism's idea of an open and penetrable system. Instead, of the kind of fluid politics Dahl ascribed to New Haven, I find relationships to be structured. Established relationships are not readily changed; it is easier to maintain relationships than to build new ones. For that reason, those in an established position are not easily pressured into adopting a new line of action.

In recently rereading Robert Crain's decades-old study of school desegregation, I was struck by Crain's surprise at failing to find the expected pattern of pluralism. Instead of "a complex, bargaining arrangement, the result of rather elaborate negotiations, threats and counterthreats," Crain found that school board members acted according to predispositions, and these predispositions rested on a civic and political network of deeply embedded relationships (1968, 357).

Looking back, one can see that change did eventually come to resistant places, such as the Boston, studied by Crain, but it came only after a prolonged and multifaceted effort that included strong intervention by the federal judiciary, the gradual building of a new body of civic relationships (including the engagement of the business sector and others), the creation of a new intermediary institution, and a restructuring of school governance to replace the elected school committee with one appointed and controlled by the mayor (Portz, Stein, and Jones 1999). Building and enlisting institutional partners proved to be a long-term process, far different from the kind of ad hoc mobilization of slack resources Dahl saw typified in Mary Grava's campaign against metal houses. The Mary Gravas of the world are able to earn occasional victories in the "retail politics" of discrete and narrow-scope decisions. However, her counterparts were unable to derail the New Haven's redevelopment agenda, resting as it did on the support of a coalition among the city's major institutional players.

As viewed through regime analysis, the political world is complex, but despite universal suffrage, open and penetrable it is not. To understand why, it is necessary to see politics as a process of shaping arrangements. That understanding separates urban regime analysis sharply from pluralism.

Whereas pluralism makes group analysis central and largely dismisses class (Polsby 1980, 118), urban regime analysis pays heed to the system of social stratification as a source of social and economic inequalities and how they work against an open and penetrable form of politics. Political activity often takes shape in a group form, but class (i.e., the system of social stratification) provides the context within which group action takes shape. For groups with a history of political, social, and economic marginality, having a political impact calls for much more than simply becoming active around a few issues of immediate concern. It calls for breaking into the "politics of investment" and becoming part of a locality's governing arrangements. Reaching such a position rests on several interrelated factors, and at the heart of them are the abilities to contribute significantly to a widely desired outcome and to enlist allies. Although politics is not a process irrevocably closed to any group, meaningful political influence rests on an ability to meet important threshold tests. For those in the lower strata of the system of social stratification, meeting those tests involves a long and difficult journey. Understanding that journey is the task of urban regime analysis.

THE INADEQUACY OF ELITE ENGAGEMENT

One of the criticisms of urban regime analysis has been that it deals only with elites and their relations to one another, not to the larger context of elite-mass relations (Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Stoker 1995). This is an important and telling criticism. Is urban regime analysis, then, a form of elitism? The answer is no, but urban regime analysis does not accord to mass opinion in and of itself an ability to direct the course of events (Shefter 1976). As observed by Gerry Stoker, "For actors to be effective regime partners two characteristics seem especially appropriate: first possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions and a capacity to act on that knowledge; and second, control of resources that make one an attractive coalition partner" (1995, 60). Thus, a governing coalition consists typically of members based in a locality's major institutions.

It is a mistake, however, to think of urban regimes as composed of a fixed body of actors, taking on an ever-changing agenda. Instead the question is about who needs to be mobilized to take on a given problem effectively. One of the fundamental tenets of urban regime analysis, what Stoker once labeled its *iron law*, is that the governing coalition must be able to draw together the resources commensurate with its policy agenda (Stoker 1995, 61).[10] As a heuristic device, urban regime analysis holds that the issue addressed determines whose participation is needed. Neither business nor any other group is

necessarily a required member of the governing coalition. The question about who needs to play an active part centers on resources, skills in action, and effort applied to task.[11] and, thus, is much more than participation in a token or pro forma manner. In the United States, for many issues, business would be a needed member of the governing coalition, but the need for business participation derives partly from the nature of the agenda. Hence, the urgency of business participation varies with the situation, both as to the character of the problem addressed and the availability of alternative sources of needed resources.

Michael Brown (1999) has argued this point persuasively in his examination of AIDS policy in Christchurch, New Zealand. For some kinds of problems, business may be largely irrelevant, except perhaps as a group able to confer a sign of legitimacy (Clark 1969). The crucial question is about who needs to contribute to problem solving. AIDS prevention is quite different from economic development. Or consider public safety. A recent study of Boston's campaign against youth violence (Berrien and Winship 2003) focuses on the important role of that city's Black clergy as part of the Ten-Point Coalition and how they play an essential role in establishing an intermediary force between law-enforcement agencies on one side and Black neighborhoods on the other:

> In Boston, the ministers of the Ten-Point Coalition have become an intermediary institution through which decisions can be made that are perceived as fair. Through their advocacy of at-risk youth and their interventions in potentially inflammatory situations, the Ten-Point ministers have gained the legitimacy needed to convince residents that they will protect the interests of the community. They have created . . . an umbrella of legitimacy for police to work under. (p. 235)

One could, of course, define the Black clergy as part of Boston's elite network and the Ten-Point Coalition as an important city institution. But the point of the analysis is that the clergy are part of a two-way connection with the neighborhood. What the coalition contributes to public safety depends on what the clergy can elicit from the neighborhood, not only in the form of quiet acceptance of police activity but also in active cooperation. In some problem areas, quiescence is far from enough.

On their own, public-sector professionals may lack the access to bring about a needed response from the relevant public. Thus, for AIDS prevention in Christchurch, the informal connections with and among the affected public were the essential resource, and civil society was the rootstock.[12] As one moves away from economic development as an issue and away from the special place that business occupies in local civic life in the United States,

business participation may become less essential. Indeed, Dorothy Shipps (2003) has cautioned that business participation can alter the character of a policy initiative, such as school reform, and potentially crowd out other more strongly needed participants.

For many issues—improved academic achievement in schools, workforce development, counteracting youth violence, reducing crime, the conservation and upkeep of neighborhoods or social housing estates, and many more—grass roots engagement is necessary but often hard to achieve.[13] Histories of past neglect and frustration, alienation, and lack of confidence that conditions can be improved and opportunities realized may stand as huge barriers not likely to be overcome by a modest initiative unaccompanied by some concerted and grounded effort to enlist the hearts and minds of the target population. Many initiatives, typically of limited scale, have resulted in disappointment and perhaps even a hardening of cynicism about the prospects of genuine change. These efforts have rarely been matters of high priority and more a matter of triage or limited opportunity for a few fortunately positioned individuals (Stone and Worgs 2004).

Economic development and showcase projects such as hosting the Olympics often hold a position of high priority, and for such projects, business involvement may be quite important. But one needs to bear in mind that the high visibility of the business sector in these issues is not a sign that it holds an equally crucial position on other issues. Yet one should also not overlook the point that business is frequently well organized and in larger cities and is almost sure to contain many enterprises that have deep pockets from which to contribute to the initiatives on which they look with favor. And American business has a long history of multifaceted participation in the civic and philanthropic life of local communities. In the United States especially, business enjoys ready-made advantages as a willing and able participant in priority agendas that it helps to set. Those who are poor and alienated may be essential participants for certain issues, but they are also typically not in a position to help shape a priority agenda unless they have experienced a sustained period of community organization and community development. I return to this theme in discussion below.

SELECTIVE INCENTIVES AND THE ROLE OF PURPOSE

Looking back on *Regime Politics* (Stone, 1989), I am least satisfied with my treatment of selective material incentives. Although they have played a major role in Atlanta, I gave the impression in some passages that they were the overriding source of biracial cooperation. They were exceedingly

important, but in retrospect, I see that my analysis understated the importance of purpose—specifically large purposes.[14] Let me elaborate.

First, I want to reiterate what *Regime Politics* does claim. In describing the mix of incentives at work in Atlanta, I said,

> Because not everyone is narrowly opportunistic, selective incentives are not the whole story of collective action. Efforts on behalf of a group purpose may be intrinsically satisfying. The political movements and other activities heavily dependent on volunteer efforts rely on emotional commitment to motivate adherents. Volunteer activities may afford opportunities for sociability or an identity with a larger group or purpose, which are not dependent on an external system of rewards and punishments. And if adherence to group obligations is widespread enough, norms or conventions of cooperation may prevail over individual opportunism. (Stone 1989, 186–87)

I also made the argument that there is a "small-opportunities" phenomenon—that is, "most people most of the time are guided, not by a grand vision of how the world might be reformed, but by the pursuit of particular opportunities" (p. 193). I then went on to say, "The point is not self-interest over altruism, since altruists also pursue small opportunities—perhaps a nonprofit housing venture, a community theater, a job-training program, saving a black business from financial setback, conservation of park land, a food bank for the hungry, a historic preservation ordinance, or an arts festival" (Stone 1989, 193).

I did argue (and still maintain) that the small-opportunities phenomenon is, in effect, a variation of the selective-incentives argument, even though it does not rest on an assumption that material gain overrides less tangible concerns. People are motivated to pursue purposes, but few are positioned to frame a large purpose *and* bring together the resources needed to pursue such a purpose. They are positioned to see attainable and more immediate purposes, and they do put significant energy and effort into their pursuit. But where there is a larger set of arrangements that can further or hinder such pursuits, people generally go along, accommodating those established relationships for their immediate purposes rather than expending the large effort to create alternative, new relationships.

The key point behind the small-opportunities phenomenon is that motives are more complex than selective material incentives. Even when emphasizing selective incentives, I saw that the gravitational pull of Atlanta's regime was by no means restricted to the motivating power of material benefits. Understood narrowly as a means for combating the free-rider problem, the concept of *selective material incentives* fails to capture fully another element of the picture. Actions such as Atlanta's redevelopment program bring about

particular losses—for example, a church facing a scattering of its membership as well as the destruction of a building weighted with substantial sentimental value. The notion of a free-rider problem does not quite capture the full dimension of the situation. The challenge is to head off potential opposition, especially from someone like a pastor with established connections and a ready-made audience. Extragenerous compensation serves as what game theorists call a side payment, and at an abstract level, it is a form of selective incentive. But my point here is to reiterate the complexity of motivation and underscore the importance of the ability to make side payments. Imagine two big projects, both of which inflict particular losses in significant numbers. One is backed by a capacity to make side payments to compensate for losses, and the other is not. Clearly, the project backed by side payments possesses a greater chance of achieving fruition. Side payments address more than a condition of apathy.

In Atlanta, the business elite has appreciated the advantages of side payments and small opportunities. Moreover, they pursued a conscious strategy of placing the capacity to offer rewards, purposive and material, as far away from the electoral process as possible. With selective incentives as the shorthand for a complex of particular moves, one can see why control of the process was an important matter. In this broad sense, selective incentives were central in the functioning of Atlanta's regime. Two things need to be pointed out, however. One is that struggle over the control of selective incentives had much to do with relations within the governing coalition. Business sought to keep an upper hand in this process and to keep it as distinct as possible from the electoral process. Hence, during the time that center-city land use was being reshaped, the redevelopment agency and the main planning processes were never directly under the control of the mayor's office. Moreover, significant entities, such as the Metropolitan Community Foundation, were outside the government arena completely and responsive mainly to their business backers.

Although particulars of the Atlanta situation should not be taken as universals of urban regime analysis, one also should not ignore the possibility that selective incentives (in the broad sense) may play a significant role even in places with a more robust government sector, strong political parties, and a tradition of corporatist decision making. Consider the case of Sweden's Million Dwelling Programme of 1965–1974, legislated nationally as part of the Social Democrats' effort to respond to the housing pressure from a huge farm-to-city move. Local arrangements are instructive. In Örebro, the same person was city council leader, head of the local Social Democratic party, and chair of the selection committee that allocated assignments to social housing.[15] Among his arrangements was an understanding with local business to

take into account the needs of their employees. In Malmö, where there was a long history of activity by a cooperative society, the building and operation of social housing was divided among the city, the cooperative, and local business.[16] In both cases, the presence of selective incentives is detectable even in the heartland of social democracy, in a program heavily concentrated within the public sector.

For those who are skeptical that selective incentives, broadly understood, are more than an occasional factor, I call for a closer look. Even so, I say today that *Regime Politics*, by paying insufficient attention to the role of large purposes, inflated the place of selective incentives in building and maintaining governing arrangements. In looking back at my study of Atlanta, I wish to say that, without denying that selective incentives often play an important part in bolstering and giving shape to political arrangements, I failed to convey the importance of big purposes. They are not the stuff of retail politics, but for substantial institutions with ample resources and extensive capacities to plan and assess, large purposes are vital building blocks. And broad civic purposes can enlist important individual efforts.

The point is not that masses of individual actors spontaneously gather under the banner of social causes. The process is complicated. But what *Regime Politics* underplayed was the importance of purpose in the form of a large change agenda, captured in the slogan "the city too busy to hate." The complex reality behind that slogan made a dual contribution to the city's governing regime. First of all, the combined agenda of business-oriented redevelopment and racial change provided a framework within which bargains could be negotiated, rewards handed out, and civic pride boosted. It was a means through which multiple forms of motivation could be tapped and thereby durable governing arrangements put into place.[17]

Selective incentives played a part, but they were in the service of some large objectives.[18] The framework of a durable purpose means that governing arrangements do not have to be reinvented issue by issue. In economic terms, a big-purpose agenda can minimize transaction costs by providing established and familiar ways of getting things done. A big-purpose agenda, thus, can provide a useful framework, and it does so on a basis that gives structure to interactions over time.[19]

But the second point is that purpose is not just an instrumental device for organizing an otherwise chaotic world. Purpose can itself be a motivator, occasionally a very powerful one. Pursuit of a broad social or civic purpose involves sacrifices of time, energy, and resources. Sometimes individuals and the organizations they guide make huge contributions and do so without receiving immediate and particular material gains. Therefore, one should not understate the role of large, socially worthy purposes. The politics of

investment—for example, of establishing governing arrangements—requires bringing together substantial resources, both tangible and intangible, from a variety of players. Broad purposes deemed to be socially worthy play a vital part.

COMPETING PURPOSES

Acknowledging the role of purpose does not eliminate the collective-action problem. Purposes compete with one another, and individuals face an abundance of worthy claims, some of which concern matters immediate in their everyday lives. Indeed, under the constraints of bounded rationality, human beings are focused on what is immediate. As suggested by the small-opportunities phenomenon, people are drawn more easily into limited aims than broad social purposes. It is easier to imagine one's role and potential impact in a small purpose than a large one.

Even so, some broad purposes do gain agenda status and others falter in the process. From early on, regime analysis differentiated the successful from the unsuccessful on the basis of the ability to garner enough resources to be feasible (Stone 1993). So achievability is one screen for separating successful from unsuccessful purposes. Most people agree with the policy activist who said, "If it's not going anywhere, it's not something I want to spend any time on" (quoted in Kingdon 1995, 171). Put another way, "What can be accomplished not infrequently affects what we want to accomplish" (Jones 2001, 147). Feasibility, one should bear in mind, is not an objective, self-defining condition. It is very much a matter of shared perception, and, as Dennis Chong has shown, it can take the form of an assurance game (1991). The real test, then, is that of *perceived* feasibility.

A second test, and one given insufficient analytical attention in *Regime Politics*, can be drawn from the work of Bryan Jones on attention shift (1994). Because there are many purposes, large and small, with claims on each of us, diffusion of attention is an ever-present force, and any given purpose is subject to displacement as others draw attention. Thus, it not only takes an institutional infrastructure to develop an agenda in the first place and give it a concrete, workable form (Stone 2001), sustained agendas (and purposes within those agendas) need ongoing protection against attention shift. From the literature on social movements, one learns about the crucial role of networks as channels of communication and sources of reinforcement (Stone 2002; see esp. McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Networks, however, are not neutral forms of protection against attention shift. Agendas are never static, and they undergo adjustment as conditions change. But the direction of the adjustment is influenced by the particulars of the network, who composes it, and the

concerns they embody. In Atlanta, for example, as the population majority shifted from White to Black, new tensions emerged and old circuitry of communication fell into disuse. As a connecting link, the broadly based Atlanta Negro Voters League was eventually succeeded by Action Forum, an elite channel closed to the public and consisting of meetings between top White business leaders and major Black leaders from business and professional (but not governmental) positions. No records are kept, and Action Forum does not report to the public. It is not surprising, then, that the agenda of the biracial coalition gives priority to matters of economic development combined with a continuing process of opening up opportunities for the African-American middle class. Significantly, initiatives, including the city's designation as an Empowerment Zone recipient, have addressed the needs of the poor, but none has proved to have staying power. None has commanded the priority attention of the core elements of the biracial coalition (Stone and Pierannunzi 2000).

SUMMARY

In *Regime Politics* (1989), I highlighted selective incentives, including "small opportunities." In that book, the large purposes embodied in the slogan "the city too busy to hate" came in for less analytical consideration than was warranted. Taking stock many years later, I see a need for a thorough examination of the role of purposes. People are meaning-seeking creatures, as recognized in passing in *Regime Politics*, and not rational egoists preoccupied with satisfying immediate material interests. As Bryan Jones observes, "Something is very wrong with the notion that rational people cooperate only out of selfish motives" (2001, 127).

Purpose has motivational force, but it is not easy to pin that force down. The appeal of broad purposes is particularly elusive and often mercurial. Such purposes are highly susceptible to attention shift. Yet within a supportive interpersonal and interorganizational context, broad purposes can inform an agenda, generate a significant appeal, and, of special importance, provide a framework within which many lesser aims and multiple forms of motivation operate. Just because big purposes do not emerge spontaneously from a sea of popular sentiment, one should not conclude that they are insignificant forces. It does mean that, given the bounded rationality of human beings, sustained purposes depend on the reinforcing support of networks. Selective incentives may be an important part of the picture, but it is purpose that provides the framework within which they operate. Narrowly understood, the free-rider problem does not capture very well the challenge of setting and

maintaining an agenda. This is not to dismiss the importance of side payments, especially as compensation for losses that may result from the pursuit of a far-reaching agenda. But it is to maintain that a focus on purpose invites examination of the questions of what gives a large purpose perceived feasibility, how the problem of attention shift is overcome, and how the interplay between purpose and supporting networks alters an agenda over time. The framing of an agenda can provide a focus for creating or reshaping networks, but the networks may also help alter the agenda as new circumstances emerge. Purposes, after all, are not static. There is a reciprocal dynamic between how a purpose is framed and the character of the supporting networks.

THEORY

As I see it, theory is not something presented in a single work, laid out authoritatively at a given time. Rather, theory development is a task done over time as an evolving body of questions come under consideration. Still, it is useful to take stock periodically and see what is being assumed, how elements of theory fit together, and weigh questions that continue to be at issue. Different scholars put the puzzle together in different ways. Below, I want to identify some broad boundaries, present what I see as key elements, and put forward some issues in need of attention.

ASSUMPTIONS

My understanding of urban regime analysis rests on assumptions both about human nature and about the character of society. To identify assumptions, however, is not to reduce the study of political arrangements to a deductive enterprise. Much is always to be learned from trying to identify the particulars of the situation to which a generalization applies.[20] I respect the warning that Philip Abrams offers against being “captivated by the possibilities of imposing elegant conceptual schemes on the vast untidiness of history” (1982, 11). Broad theorizing has its uses, but I confess to substantial skepticism about grand theories of historical development. In political study, I see room for foxes as well as hedgehogs (Berlin [1953] 1978).

At the microlevel, I assume two things about human nature. One is bounded rationality—that people are not comprehensively rational and, therefore, often operate from habit, consideration of what is immediately at hand, and a limited grasp of the total situation. That is why structured rela-

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[...]

THE HEART OF THE BEAST

The political condition that urban regime analysis probes is weakness in the foundation for democratic politics. Why is one person, one vote an insufficient foundation? In contemporary society, addressing problems calls for complex forms of action. Any major problem has many strands that affect many people in multiple ways. No single action is likely to make much lasting difference. For that reason, problem solving calls for multistage thinking, planning, and action—far beyond what clusters of what even active but loosely organized citizens are capable. Bounded rationality is sharply confining in ways that can best be overstepped by actors who are part of arrangements that facilitate far-reaching deliberations. In short, the "retail" politics of pressuring officials on particular issues makes little long-term difference. Sustained courses of action stem from arrangements built to further a priority agenda. Without a link into institutional arrangements, scattered bodies of even aroused citizens are in no position to develop and pursue such agendas.

The notion that elite competition gives a mass citizenry leverage to direct the course of governmental action is more than an oversimplification; it fundamentally mischaracterizes the nature of policy making. Governing is not an autonomous activity that is subject to pressure from a periodically active citizenry. Especially for local concerns involving issues that impinge directly on the lives of citizens, it matters greatly who is able to become an integral part of efforts at problem solving.

Different problem arenas give rise to quite different challenges. Intergovernmental mechanisms and interlocal relationships can aggravate or ameliorate problems and help shape responses to them. For example, central government funding can stimulate action, but sometimes such funding carries with it conditions that work against the scope and level of local cooperation that may be needed for effective action (Davies 2001, 2003). Still the nature of local political and civic arrangements carries great weight.

In U.S. localities, for many structural reasons, business typically has a heavy presence in local civic life. The character of land ownership and of land-use planning, the nature of the system of taxation and revenue distribution, the pattern of city-suburb relations, and the importance of private credit to public borrowing are among the contributors to this pattern, and they differentiate the situation in the United States from that in Europe. This is not to suggest that private business is an insignificant force in European local politics, nor to deny that the role of business may be on the rise (see, e.g., LeGalès 2000, 2002). But the United States has a long history of a Main Street/City Hall alliance around issues of development. That history need not be reviewed here, but it bears keeping in mind that, particularly in large U.S.

cities with their highly organized business sectors, a changing economy has been fertile ground for government and business leaders to make common cause in devising responses. In America, with its weak party system and anemic labor movement, local business has been in a position to become part of the fabric of governing. Typically, business did not so much pressure government as become part of the governing process around a priority agenda of adapting the city to a changing economic role.

Mobilizing to become part of a concerted effort to develop and pursue a priority agenda of development, in some sense, came easy, but nevertheless required substantial effort and detailed planning. Areas such as education and public safety—areas in which, in the United States, a tradition of local control is strong—pose a different kind of challenge. In middle-class communities, the meshing of governmental and nongovernmental efforts in such areas as public safety and the schooling of young children often required no special mobilization. An advantaged position in the system of social stratification enabled the secure and affluent middle class, especially, to blend smoothly into day-to-day governance in education and public safety.[23] If demographic change undermined an easy melding of governmental and household efforts, joining an exodus to the suburbs was an alternative. Exit rather than voice and mobilization has thus sometimes been a response to heightened concern about public-service performance.

Faced with political, social, and economic obstacles to exit, disadvantaged populations have had to cope with a history of marginality and confinement to aging urban areas. They are weakly connected to the political and civic life of cities and have no ready means of mobilization—along with little confidence that it would make a difference even if attempted. Often alienated from both schools and police and subject to damaging stereotypes, disadvantaged populations are weakly positioned to become part of the fabric of governing. Meshing household and public efforts has happened only in limited and sporadic ways, but enough constructive activity has occurred to show that change is possible, but only if a strategy of inclusion and integration can achieve priority status.

Looking back at the period since the end of World War II, one can see why priority agendas in U.S. cities have been heavily skewed toward economic development, more so than is the case in European cities (Sellers 2002). At the same time, European experiences with efforts to promote urban regeneration and combat social exclusion have had only limited success. Many of these efforts appear far short of priority standing on the local agenda (see, e.g., Geddes 2000; Davies 2002; Evers, Schulz, and Wiesner 2004). Hence, although it is important to recognize significant differences in the position of localities between Europe and the United States, a general pattern is evident

in which economic development and a favorable climate for business investment enjoy an advantage in agenda setting and efforts to expand opportunities for lower-status groups and incorporate them into the mainstream of social and economic life appear to suffer significant and persisting handicaps.

Social problems are deeply embedded in a system of stratified inequality that impedes the ability of lower-status groups to contribute to the amelioration of these problems. The dilemma is that these groups are weakly positioned to contribute to governing, but without becoming an integral part of local governance, they can do little to further an agenda of needed change. Because pressure on government and other established institutions has little lasting effect, the question is whether a set of orchestrated moves can gradually alter the position of lower-status groups in the desired direction.

Thus, urban regime analysis is about more than why economic development so often occupies a priority position in agenda setting; it is also about what it would take to build and maintain a different priority agenda, one that is aimed at ameliorating social problems. From this angle, urban regime analysis spotlights two basic questions:

1. To what extent and under what conditions can lower-status populations have their alienation addressed so that they can be mobilized as active partners in efforts to bring about opportunity expansion?
2. To what extent and under what conditions can local government actors, with various forms of intergovernmental support, coordinate their efforts with one another and with actors from the nongovernmental sector on behalf of opportunity-expanding policies?

In addressing these questions, one needs to differentiate between token efforts and large-scale policies. Much of what happens currently, whether the New Deal in Britain, Empowerment Zones in the United States, regeneration of social housing in Denmark, or "Social City" programs in Germany, appear to be token measures, perhaps better described as triage than genuine opportunity expansion. None of this is to deny that central governments and other translocal actors can play a part (Stone and Worgs 2004, 274), but it is to contend that an ultimate test resides in the local community. The various efforts and contributions come together there and not somewhere else.

THE ANALYTICS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

As this discussion has indicated, the political challenge probed by urban regime analysis has far-reaching elements. Yet, at its core, urban regime analysis centers on the question of how local communities are governed. How do

they establish and pursue problem-solving priorities? Structural forces form the context, but because the formal authority of government is but one component in addressing problems of community-wide import, nongovernmental (and sometimes informal) links are an integral part. Let me now set forth the core elements of a model of local governance.

Proceeding from an assumption that winning an election is no guarantee of being able to assemble needed resources, I posit that governing arrangements stem from a strategic set of connections. Four elements are key:

- an agenda to address a distinct set of problems;
- a governing coalition formed around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members;
- resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition; and
- given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing.[24]

In this model of governing, an ability to gain elected office may be an important factor, but not necessarily the central one. Moreover, continuity of arrangements is not a matter of sustained, favorable ratings in opinion polls, nor is it a matter of coming out on top in all controversial issues. Instead, continuity rests on recognition by a set of resource-commanding actors that they need to act together to solve problems and pursue goals. The importance of winning or losing elections turns on a broader issue about the adequacy of resources. The key question is about what resources are needed and who will be motivated to provide them. The term *resources* includes not just material matters but also such things as skills, expertise, organizational connections, informal contacts, and level and scope of contributing effort by participants.

With resources at center stage, one can see why governing *tends* to reflect the inequalities of society's system of social stratification. The "hidden hand" of narrow and immediacy-minded political agency, celebrated in classic pluralism, serves only to perpetuate and even accentuate inequality. The question is whether, in the service of a heightened sense of interdependence and an enlarged awareness of collective interest, political agency can ameliorate inequalities sufficiently to pursue aims of social equity and inclusion.

Merely imagining a social-reform agenda guarantees nothing. There is in place no effective capacity to govern into which the latest policy concern can be inserted. For any policy issue, governing arrangements have to be fashioned. Thus, for regime analysis, the presence of a model does not assume that every locality has a strong and effective set of governing arrangements. Instead, the model provides a way of looking at an array of arrangements and

determining if, in fact, strength and stability are related to a congenial fit among agenda, coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation. The model is about how parts fit together. It has an analytical capacity applied to current arrangements, and it also predicts what needs to be in place for a social-reform initiative to take hold and succeed.

In and of itself the model does not explain several things about the particulars of governance:

- from what specific concerns the agenda emanates (this is a matter of human agency but with the changing economy expected to be a wellspring of issues[25]);
- what, in particular, motivates actors to play a part in the governing coalition (though motivation would presumably be closely connected to the agenda's content, along with past experience and resource capability);
- what resources are relevant (this would depend on the particular problems the agenda addresses); and
- the origin of the practices that go into a scheme of cooperation (but with a blend of shared purpose, selective incentives, and networks expected to figure prominently).

The combined strength of the elements in the model account theoretically for capacity to govern and level of stability. The particular locality provides the contingent content. The model itself is not an explanation of why various cities have the actors that they do but rather is a guide to help identify those elements that are key, how they are related, and how changes in those elements can account for continuity and change in capacity to govern. In short, the elements of the model itself are generic and, therefore, conceptually distinct from the various contexts in which they operate, but the context provides specifics that fit into the model. Hence, localities can differ according to the role of the business sector in relation to a priority agenda—united and engaged, factionalized, or largely disengaged. Similarly, voting blocs can be reliable and stably engaged or volatile and subject to change. Schemes of cooperation can be weak and largely ad hoc or they can be embedded in tradition and reliably brought into play across a range of issues. The composition of the players themselves may vary. In some places, the newspaper or a charitable foundation could play a significant role, but in other places, such an actor may be missing. Political party leaders play a part in some places but not others. Governmental officials, elected and appointed, may play wide and leading roles, but sometimes may not. Intergovernmental channels of communication may be a significant part of the arrangement or not, depending on the issues and the place (Burns and Thomas 2004). Once particulars are fit into the model

and their contribution assessed, then the model can be used to predict the capacity of the arrangements to sustain their governing effort. The hard part is assessing the particulars that make up the model.

Overall, urban regime analysis has two sides. One concerns how particular regimes come into being. It is about *significant historical details*—how an agenda came to be framed in a particular way, what brought coalition partners together (or after a period of time, what caused a break), why coalition partners devised the scheme of cooperation they did, and so forth. On this side, the concept of an *urban regime* serves to identify important foci of historical research. It does not in itself predict the course of history.

The other, more abstract side of urban regime analysis centers on a *model* of how governing arrangements operate. The model focuses on the combination of factors that promise viable and durable arrangements. The agenda (the problem-solving task), resource adequacy, and alignment by key actors (the governing coalition) in the absence of a command system (hence, a need for a scheme of cooperation)—these are the elements that need to be brought to strength and aligned for governing arrangements to be viable and stable. The analysis ascertains the strength level and predicts stability and effectiveness accordingly. In this way, governing arrangements can be arrayed along a spectrum, from strong and durable to weak and unstable, with most places in fact likely to fall somewhere in the intermediate area because bringing all four elements to full and complementary strength is difficult.[26]

The urban-regime model can thus serve as a source of contingent hypotheses. In somewhat oversimplified terms, if resources mobilized in city A are inadequate for the agenda task of public school reform, then viable governing arrangements cannot be constructed around school reform and school reform cannot hold a priority position on the action agenda of city A. A given state of affairs for the four key elements can thus be fit into the abstract relationships of the model to predict an outcome. That is different from explaining how historically the state of affairs came into being. It is different, for example, from explaining why, in city A, the school-reform coalition is too weak to bring together the resources needed.

Normal science celebrates the predictive capacity of models—if condition *x*, then consequence *y*. For the reform minded, the urban-regime model can operate in this manner and serve to highlight important needs. School reformers, for example, might see in the model a reason that parental engagement is an important component of effective school reform. But the model in itself does not inform us how to achieve parent engagement. That is a question perhaps best answered by research into community development and community organizing (for important case studies on this point see, Shirley

1997, 2002; Gold et al. 2001). In other words, the urban-regime model provides a guide as to where policy-relevant research is needed, but the model itself operates in a more confined scope of explanation. Nevertheless, the model provides means by which various otherwise distinct strands of explanation can be synthesized. At the level of the model itself, explanation takes the form of saying that, if school reform is to hold a priority position and be effective, then parent and community engagement forms an essential element. That line of explanation points to the value of additional analysis of what is needed to strengthen parent and community engagement.

On the surface, this kind of analysis is value free. A strong and stable regime might serve ends that are reprehensible (note, as an example, the racially exclusionary regime in Dearborn, Michigan, under Mayor Orville Hubbard [Good 1989]). However, regime analysis can be used to show how a given set of arrangements falls short in scope of representation. For example, Dorothy Shipps (2003) argues that, in Chicago under Mayor Richard M. Daley, business engagement has marginalized representation of parent and community groups, with consequent results for school reform. In Philadelphia, a failure to bring educators into the school-reform coalition under David Hornbeck contributed to the quick demise of what at first looked like a promising initiative (Boyd and Chrisman 2003; Christman et al. 2003; Foley 2001).

Thus, although the internal dynamics of the model predict outcomes, the model itself does not pass a normative judgment (even though regime analysis grows out of a normative concern about the consequences of socioeconomic inequality). At the same time, the model is also in line with the normative ideal that those people who are most directly affected by a policy should be included in the process of making policy. The regime model predicts that, if they are not included, the policy problem addressed will not be effectively tackled and the policy effort may falter. From current research, as one examines various efforts to combat poverty and achieve social inclusion in both Europe and the United States, one sees a pattern of modest efforts, limited engagement, and persisting problems. Resources are typically sparse and efforts to enlist the poor frequently amount to little more than a triage operation.[27] The urban-regime model predicts that such efforts will not occupy a priority position, will not be scaled up, and can be stabilized, if at all, only as a small and marginal activity commensurate with the limited resources it commands.

Urban regime analysis offers an explanation for why full-scale successes are rarely recorded, and it points to a need to refashion approaches. In their aptly titled book, *Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots*, Larry Cuban and Michael Usdan (2003) caution that if urban school reform is to be effective,

then teachers and parents need to be an integral part of the process, and schools, particularly high schools, need to be recast as part of a broader process of engaging and serving youth. As it stands now, local efforts to solve social problems are often little more than pilot or demonstration projects and lack the scale and community-development depth that would be needed to overcome the alienation of the poor and socially excluded.

CONCLUSION

Urban regime analysis does not offer itself as a comprehensive theory and thus does not claim the scope of theories such as rational choice and Marxism. Its aim is more at an intermediate level where attention can be directed toward effective forms of problem solving. Urban regime analysis does, however, rest on assumptions both about the grounds of microbehavior and about the nature of society writ large. And the specific view that human beings are more than interest-driven creatures provides a foundation for the important place that purpose occupies in urban regime analysis.

Structures enter urban regime analysis in a framework of structure and agency. The research posture taken is that of seeking to understand how human agents in a given local context (or range of local contexts) see their situation and choose to act on it. Structures lie behind such activities as framing agendas, building coalitions, devising schemes of cooperation, and making use of and sometimes reshaping interorganizational and interpersonal networks, but the focus is on human agents in action. Even if global capitalism is the overall setting, human agents devise responses, and these responses take into consideration factors much more proximate than the international economy. By no means do I intend to suggest that the mobility of capital is of little consequence, only that local responses to it are contingent on complex factors (Clarke and Gaile 1998).

The parentage of urban regime analysis lies in political economy and the transparent reality that government actions inevitably intertwine with the workings of the economy. In the case of local economic development, much attention is given to matching governmental and business efforts, and public-private partnerships often give formal recognition to complementarity. Yet one needs to look beyond this obvious instance. It is no happenstance that civil society and social capital have become major topics of interest. Complementarity extends across the full scope of public policy; efforts in such matters as education, public safety, and disease prevention depend on how government actions mesh with private behavior. In some cases, meshing involves little overt coordination.

In middle-class communities, public schools typically perform well because households provide early childhood learning readiness of a kind and at a level to which educators are receptive. Later, family and friends supply auxiliary reinforcements and model how academic achievement can yield attractive opportunities. Lower-class children face a more obstacle-laden academic path with many fewer supports, and schools, along with other public agencies, perform less well in counteracting these obstacles (Lareau 2003; Rothstein 2004). Where the private household has less market power, less detailed information, fewer reinforcing role models, and forms of social capital to which schools are less responsive, then the mesh between public and private efforts is less productive of academic achievement (Comer 1980 [1993]; Horvat, Weininger, and Lareau 2003).

In the current era of wide attention to school reform, there are many instances of partnership, both formal and informal, to promote greater academic achievement. But the complexities of framing an appropriate agenda, bringing together the relevant coalition, supplying needed resources (including skills at bridging social divides), and finding a way of fostering an adequate level of cooperation, in combination, constitute a truly formidable task. Despite abundant rhetoric and supportive public sentiment, few places have managed to give academic improvement a position of high and sustained priority.

One should bear in mind that to invoke the words *governing* or *governance* is not to suggest that the process is always effective. Often it is not, or is only partly effective. The heuristic core of urban regime analysis illuminates what has to be harmonized to provide stable and effective arrangements. An urban-regime perspective thus highlights why many social programs fail or never rise above the level of triage operations. To be effective, such programs have to enlist active engagement from the target population. However, a long history of neglect and frustration stands as a barrier to effective involvement. This history can be countered only if substantial resources (including skills and efforts) are committed to the task by governmental actors and others outside the target communities. In a society with substantial social and economic inequalities, this is the severe test for social purpose as leverage to advance democratic inclusion. In such a society, is it possible to frame an appropriate agenda and build the needed coalition, complete with the cooperation and mobilization of resources, through which social inclusion can be effectively pursued in a sustained manner?

Small efforts cannot change the sociopolitical context enough to overcome deeply rooted alienation. From past experience, one can see that substantial resources invested in community development and community organization are a needed first step toward political inclusion. Contrary to various

pluralist assumptions, neither protests nor voting mobilizations are enough to achieve a place within arrangements for governing. Pressure on a governing arrangement is insufficient. A group needs to be in a position to contribute actively to a shared aim of problem solving. If localities are to achieve large-scale successes in urban education, workforce development, countering youth violence, and promoting neighborhood revitalization, then they need to be able to blend the efforts and contributions of lower socioeconomic status populations with those of established institutions. Bland talk about partnership or parent involvement will fall far short unless accompanied by a sophisticated form of enablement.

Political inclusion is thus at least a two-step process. Taking a cue from early work on the "two faces of power," urban regime analysis lays out a systematic argument that governing, as opposed to ad hoc decisions or concessions here and there, rests on a level of politics in which substantial resources, complex capacities to plan and execute, and skills in building cooperation and devising forms of coordination are far beyond the ordinary citizen. Thus, urban regime analysis suggests that institutional repair, community development and community organizing, and reshaping civil society are among the steps needed before one can characterize local politics as open and penetrable. That these are necessary steps does not make them sufficient, but this is as far along the road of reforming society as urban regime analysis can take us on its own.

NOTES

1. To avoid a claim that my approach constitutes a broad theoretical explanation of urban politics, I use the term *urban regime analysis* rather than *urban regime theory.* As indicated below, I make some assumptions about human nature (e.g., bounded rationality) and about society writ large (e.g., it lacks tight structural coherence), but these assumptions are not employed to build deductively an encompassing theory. They simply serve to frame inquiry. I do posit some important connections (e.g., resources must be commensurate with the agenda pursued), and in this vein, I present a model of the immediate elements that make up strong and effective governing arrangements. As elaborated below, the model treats only a portion of urban regime analysis. Also, it should be noted that although I bring important normative concerns to my work, the model itself is not normative. Hence, a regime may be strong but nevertheless inflict injustice.

2. Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1951) should be seen as a close companion of *Who Governs?* (Dahl 1961) as a fount of pluralist political analysis. But within urban political science, *Who Governs?* is in a category unto itself. Other early and notable works include Polsby (1980), Wolfinger (1974), and Wildavsky (1964).

3. Judge (1995, 22) is right to argue on Dahl's behalf that *Who Governs?* acknowledges inequalities and Dahl never goes so far as to argue that all groups are equally able to defend their interests, but Dahl is much more focused on the "dispersed" part of "dispersed inequalities" than on the "inequalities" part. Dahl says explicitly that New Haven's "political stratum is easily

penetrated by anyone whose interests and concerns attract him to the distinctive political culture of the stratum. It is easily penetrated because (among other reasons) elections and competitive parties give politicians a powerful motive for expanding their coalitions and increasing their electoral followings" (1961, 91). The weight of Dahl's argument (and he is the most systematic in spelling out his argument) is that numbers counterbalance wealth and other advantages of those in the upper socioeconomic stratum. An elected official, the mayor, is found to be the most influential figure in the city, and Dahl states, "The preferences of any group that could swing its weight at election time—teachers, citizens of the Hill, Negroes on Dixwell Avenue, or Notables—would weigh heavily in the calculations of the Mayor (1961, 214). Although Dahl's later work acknowledges that there are significant inequalities, he never takes up the task of reexamining systematically key arguments about "slack" in the system and motivation for political mobilization.

4. See Dahl's discussion of "variations in alternative opportunities" (1961, 293–96).

5. Baumgartner and Jones critique classic pluralism (see esp. 1993, 15–16), but at the same time, they seem to take the vulnerability of any equilibrium to fresh forms of issue definition as an indication that politics is open and penetrable, if not in the short run, then in the intermediate run. They acknowledge class bias, but also say that "many times the disadvantaged win" (1993, 249). Ultimately, they fall back on the position that "if lower class groups certainly do not have equal say, neither do small groups of elites control the process" (1993, 250). Thus, when confronted with the issue of inequality, the authors of this often brilliant book ultimately fall back on an undemanding notion of pluralism, whereas a more analytically exacting conception might have pushed them deeper into questions about what makes for a sustainable agenda and how social class enters the picture.

6. Among those who have described regime analysis as a form of pluralism are Davies (2002), Judge (1995), Lauria (1999), and Mollenkopf (1992).

7. Note that in their important work on political incorporation, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) emphasize electoral politics, define the governing coalition in terms of who controls city hall, and pick as key issues those that primarily concern actions of local government—public employment, appointments to boards and commissions, and the creation of civilian review boards for police conduct. Their initial analysis is squarely within the pluralist tradition. In later work, they recognize structural inequalities but do not offer a theoretical reconciliation between electoral power and structures of socioeconomic inequality.

8. See also the carefully documented argument of Rae (2003).

9. At one point, Dahl acknowledges the particular point (1961, 200) but still does not move beyond electoral leverage as the central fulcrum of politics (1961, 214).

10. This element of urban regime analysis is the basis for the typology presented by Stone (1993).

11. Because local governments are dependent on external resources for many matters, including authorizations, noncity actors can figure importantly into governing arrangements. In Atlanta, for example, as the city became a site for major league sports, large conventions, and big special events, the state played a key role as funder and partner in development. Larry Keating shows, for example, that the role of the State of Georgia in the Olympic Games was part of a long-standing pattern (2001, 146–48). Even Atlanta's much heralded (at the time) school desegregation was part of a carefully scripted abandonment of massive resistance, in which the state-appointed Sibley Commission played a vital role (Stone 1989, 47). Non-Atlanta examples also abound. Note, for instance, that the alliance supporting the Boston Strategy To Prevent Youth Violence includes the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts (Pruitt 2001). The important point theoretically is about ability and willingness to contribute to addressing a problem and whether or how it can be done cooperatively. That urban regimes would involve only local agency is a

peculiar notion that fits neither the facts of city experiences nor analytical arguments about local governance.

12. On the parallel Swiss experience, see Neuenschwander, Kübler, and Frey (2004) and the sources cited therein.

13. See the discussion of "wicked issues" by Stewart (2000, 110–11).

14. On the other hand, I take comfort from the fact that, in making a close examination of urban regime analysis, Gerry Stoker went right to the central point and attributes to purpose a proper place: "The task of regime formation is about gaining a shared sense of purpose and direction" (1995, 61).

15. See also the discussion of a councilor role in British local government (Goss 1988, 30).

16. My sources are Billing, Ollson, and Stigendal (1996); Strömberg (1996); and Elander and Strömberg (2001).

17. On the point that arrangements resting on multiple forms of motivation are more durable than those resting on a narrow foundation, see Wrong (1980).

18. This is not to deny that there are circumstances in which the distribution of particular material rewards crowds out larger purposes. See, for example, the case of Naples in Savitch and Kantor (2002). In the United States, Boston is an instructive case in which local actors mobilized to replace a patronage system to create political space for the pursuit of a business-backed development agenda (Erie 1988, 177; Horan 1997). Note also the tension in public education between performance and employment regimes (Stone 1998, 8–14).

19. In some ways, my argument here is akin to the position of Stoker and Mossberger (1994), who call attention to the possibility of constructing regimes around a shared tradition or ideology. A difference, however, lies in the emphasis I place on purpose as a concrete and identifiable goal around which various actors can mobilize. From the social-movement literature, note Sidney Tarrow's point about "action premises" and his warning that "societal mentalities are far too diffuse, too detached from actual historical agents, and too distant from collective action situations to use effectively in understanding how movements construct meaning" (1992, 196). Certainly, there is variation from situation to situation, but Tarrow is directing our attention to a middle ground between the very general and the narrowly particular and immediate.

20. I find a consistent school of thought in the following sources of significant variety: Stinchcombe (1978); Kingdon (1995); Mucciaroni (1992); Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilley (2001); and Blyth (2003). The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.

21. Hence, I see as weak the grounds for claiming that there is a "hegemonic project." Certainly, larger forces are at work, but viewing society as loosely joined carries with it the assumption that there are multiple projects rather than a single hegemonic one.

22. See also the discussion of social mechanisms in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001).

23. I use the phrase *day-to-day governance* here to distinguish routine and small-scale interactions and forms of cooperation from critical mobilizations aimed at altering established patterns and charting new policy pathways. Even where a priority agenda is firmly established, as in Atlanta's "city too busy to hate" slogan, the scope of such an agenda prevents it from becoming routine. However, ongoing consultation remains necessary, and its persistence is an indicator of a stable arrangement for governing. In Atlanta, biracial consultation has gone through periods of significant regularization. Note, for instance, the Pound Cake Summit meetings during Maynard Jackson's first mayoralty or Action Forum, started in 1969 and running to the present time (Stone 1989, 93, 97). As I use *governance* (a term in need of a close reexamination), it is broader than, but includes, building regime arrangements.

24. The military saying about the need "to resource the main effort" goes to the heart of the matter (see also Barnard 1938 [1968]). The four elements here are about the main effort (the

agenda), resources, the suppliers of the resources (the governing coalition), and coordination among the suppliers (scheme of cooperation).

25. But note the examination of AIDS policy in Brown (1999); on the place of identity issues in regime building, see especially Bailey (1999).

26. As is evident here, instead of risking reification, I favor demystifying the concept of *urban regime*. It will be more productive to think about governing arrangements varying in capacity to pursue different agendas than to argue about a threshold point in a litmus test for regimeness. The term *urban regime* was intended to foster thinking about building and maintaining governing arrangements, with Atlanta's biracial coalition as an instructive case.

27. See, for example, Stone and Worgs (2004); Evers, Schulz, and Wiesner (2004); Vestergaard (2000); Geddes (2000); and Davies (2002). This use of the term *triage* is borrowed from Suskind (1998).

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