The Empowerment Puzzle:

In Pursuit of a New Dimension in Governing the City

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Abstract

City politics has shifted from the era of redevelopment led mainly by a business-city hall alliance (what Robert Salisbury once termed a "new convergence of power." For governing, the logic of the situation continues to call for a fit between resource capacity and issue scope. A very large-scale mobilization of resources and skills was required to pursue the outsized and highly consequential agenda of urban redevelopment in the years following World War II. Today, with diminished engagement by corporate business, foundations and the "ed & med" sector (universities, hospitals, and professional schools) are now prime prospects for supplying vital resources needed for addressing the challenges faced by cities and their marginal groups. While there is no "new convergence of power" capable of setting priorities commensurate in scope with those of the redevelopment era, foundations and "ed & med" institutions can interact with disadvantaged communities to form significant policy alliances. As a Baltimore example illustrates, such hybrid arrangements between unequals form an important area for inquiry into the politics of today's cities.

Prologue

Change is afoot. Has the time arrived for urban regime analysis to receive "burial with honor" (Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe. 2007). Work on urban regimes has centered mainly on the formation of governing coalitions. My work on Atlanta, for instance, shows how an unlikely biracial alliance came together around a combined agenda of economic growth and moderate steps to move beyond the region's Jim Crow system (Stone 1989). It also shows that an alternative agenda of neighborhood conservation and improvement failed to gain traction as insiders in the biracial coalition learned to combine broad group aims with selective incentives to navigate several controversial issues and maintain an ability to set city priorities. Atlanta fits a broad pattern identified by Robert Salisbury as (then) "the new convergence of power," highlighting how, despite many past instances of friction and antagonistic interests, city hall and corporate business combined forces to launch redevelopment and promote economic growth.[1]

For Atlanta and other cities, while the pursuit of economic development continues as a primary concern, the era of saving the business core through massive changes in land use is largely spent. Economic competitiveness remains as a major consideration, but the understanding of that concern has enlarged to encompass human capital and quality of life issues.[2] As redevelopment interacted with the Great Migration, Atlanta and many other cities found themselves struggling with large concentrations of poor people.[3] Driven partially by a global economy, some cities are currently experiencing significant gentrification (Hyra 2008; Pattillo 2007); and poverty has now found its way into the suburbs (Weir 2011; Weir and Reckhow 2012; Kneebone and Berube 2013). Still, inner-city poverty has demonstrated

stubborn persistence (Sharkey 2013), and most cities never addressed in a large way the accumulated social destruction and neglect that were so much a part of the redevelopment years.

Despite a broad array of accumulated needs, there is little evidence today of a power convergence, particularly around a broad initiative of social reconstruction. Thus serious problems endure and are widely recognized, but no encompassing program of change has found its way onto the urban agenda. For the present time, the relevant politics of social reconstruction is piecemeal.[4] And, for that matter, so are many efforts at economic growth as well.

There is need, then, for some reframing of what it means to govern the contemporary American city. Focusing on the formation and operation of governing coalitions tied to a broad-scope agenda often fails to capture an important dimension of local politics. A governing initiative on the scale of yesteryear's redevelopment agenda would require an extraordinary mobilization of resources unlikely to be repeated. After all, the Salisbury-identified convergence of power involved not only resources from city hall and the business sector but federal largesse poured into urban renewal and expressway construction in amounts not conceivable in today's political climate. We are left with the question of what piecemeal governing looks like and whose concerns receive attention. I freely acknowledge that conventional regime analysis stands in need of modification, but I also maintain that modification needs to come without losing sight of the close link between resource capacity and the pursuit of policy aims.

The general principle still holds that governing is not a generic capacity; there is in place no power to govern that can simply be captured by taking charge of the official arms of city government. Governing entails an ongoing process of building and modifying arrangements to bring capacity and policy goals into alignment. No ready-made capability is there for the picking.

In this paper on governing in the contemporary city, I offer a two-step argument. The first step centers on a tripartite schema showing how the fit between resource capacity and issue scope varies by social strata. This schema explains much of the policy-making in the years following World War II and running through the 1970s. It treats governing as a tri-layered process of: (1) an elite-guided process of setting a broad strategic-direction agenda for the city, (2) among the middle strata efforts to gain and protect narrow benefits while avoiding costs, and (3) for the city's marginal population an occasional veto or limited concession, bounded by unsuccessful attempts by and on behalf of the city's lower strata to fundamentally alter relationships. Between levels (2) and (3), needs differ greatly, resources vary significantly, and issue scope is sometimes seemingly close but also subject to occasional fluctuation for (3).[5]

These three levels correspond roughly to Paul Peterson's developmental, allocational, and redistributive politics (1981). My schema differs from Peterson's in that his model rests on the assumed constraint of a consensus about what is good for the city as a whole—mainly to pursue economic growth and eschew redistribution, but that allows some narrow maneuvering in such

matters as adjusting the balance between patronage and merit employment.[6] Much print has gone into disputing Peterson's claim that city politics is mainly about what reasonable actors agree on, but there is no need here to review the extensive literature that makes a case that programs such as redevelopment were strongly contested. With their legacies of social damage from developmental initiatives and from inattention to the quality of services for a growing population of poor and near-poor residents, the conditions of today's cities rebut the Panglossian argument that policy-makers rationally followed the good of the whole. Step one in my paper offers a framework built around differing capacities to mobilize resources. It helps explain much of what happened in a now-past era of redevelopment.

In the second step of my argument, I turn to a more complex picture that has emerged in the latter years of the 20th century and spilled over into the 21st. Political development and policy-making have evolved to bring cross-level combinations into prominence. The one I emphasize is a hybrid form in which governing includes interactions mixing resource-rich players with lower-strata groups controlling scant and marginal resources in policy efforts significantly bearing on concerns of both.[7]

A First Step in Rethinking the Governance of Cities

Because power is situation specific, authors need to be clear about the focus of their inquiry. Mine is governing at the city level.[8] Below I take up what that entails, what it covers and doesn't cover. Governing involves intentional actions, and these develop within what might be termed "*the logic of the situation*, specifically within an inescapable relationship between issue scope and resource capacity.   Empowerment has to be understood in a context— empowered to take on what?

To be empowered presumably means to have a capacity to do something that could not be done previously. It could be a matter of mobilizing for action where organization had been lacking, but the world of mobilization is not frictionless. Mobilization is not a simple matter of taking up readily available "slack resources."[9] For some actors such resources may be scant in relation to desired goals. Inequality is a pervasive condition, and accessible resources reflect a stratified socio-economic structure (Stone 1980). Any move toward empowerment has to come to terms with that reality.

Against this background I assert that *actors in pursuit of policy aims need resources commensurate with the goals they seek* (Stone 1993). Thus the logic of a situation can constrain the degree to which goal pursuit even develops. Effort can be cut off by a sense of futility; some things are seen as not doable. As once put to me by a player in Atlanta politics: "You can't beat city hall and money." Power thus can be manifested in the level of issue scope deemed feasible. Passivity in the face of an issue or latent issue might not come from intrinsic disinterest but from lack of resources to pursue the issue.

In proceeding to the process of governing, let's put aside any assumption that governing is a matter of comprehensive control. No, at any given time much is regarded as settled and thus not something in need of governing. Furthermore, some large trends may "surge, swell, go on willy nilly, and develop with some measure of autonomy," and they stand in contrast with enacted changes stemming from the conscious decisions of strategically placed actors (Bell 1961, 346). As I use the term, governing is active policymaking; it is about neither what is settled nor about broad changes taking shape outside the intentions of policymakers. Thus *governing consists of deliberate efforts to bring about or actively prevent policy changes*, and it is selective in what is addressed, both in substantive terms (addressing "this" while not addressing "that") and in scope (falling in each instance somewhere in a range from tinkering with narrow particulars to efforts to remake large slices of city life). Hence the resource demands for access to the governing process depend on what is at issue and its scope. As applied below, this connection between issue scope and mobilizable resources forms the logic of the situation, but this logic does not necessarily sit well with all who are constrained by it. Specifically, marginal groups may have an impulse to bring about more change than the logic of their situation will sustain.

To elaborate, governing is about intentionally taking authoritative action. We need to be careful, however, not to see "authoritative" as confined to what is done officially. In their treatment of political development, Orren and Skowronek call for a polity-centered approach which "serves to dissolve any stark analytic separation between state and society" (2004, 19).[10] For city politics, I want to state the matter more forcefully by asserting that, institutional differentiation notwithstanding, government, society, and economy are heavily intertwined.[11] Hence governing is a process in which formal government plays a major (but sometimes less than defining) role; government is not a deeply autonomous force but one that operates as an institutional sector heavily infused by other sectors.[12] Moreover, relevant "actions" may in some cases include deliberate inaction, that is, non-enforcement of regulations or standing by passively in the face of outbreaks of disorder and violence. Consider various law-enforcement responses in the Deep South during the civil rights movement.

Governing is not a tightly integrated process, but a loose alignment of levels which reflect two important considerations. One is that *different socio-economic strata have quite different capacities to engage the governing process*. The second is that different strata have different dispositions about promoting change. Let me illustrate with a simplified schema or model consisting of three levels.[13] Mostly the various strata inhabit different political worlds with quite different challenges. *Governing in the different tiers of a political order coincides with the fit between the resource capacity various groups have and the scope of policy issue which they are able to engage.* The challenge of local political empowerment is encountered in this context.

Consider three levels of city politics. As issue scope broadens from, say, short-term adjustments in routine services to broad matters of establishing the strategic direction of the city,

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requirements of resource capacity greatly heighten. One is a small, everyday matter calling only for modest resources. The other is about setting a priority agenda and it can make heavy resource demands. Coping with marginality is a different matter from both. Understanding the lower level of the political order also calls for realizing that established and routine relationships are not necessarily benign. They may include forms of exploitation, disregard for laws and formal rules, and failures to meet official obligations to serve all. Hence conditions in the lower level of the social order give rise to contrary drives. Even as resource scarcity undercuts a quest for a part in governing, a problem-filled existence can feed an impulse toward engaging the governing process as a way of altering   the situation.

Every-day politics as the broad mid-level in governing a city.

Many city residents at least moderately well off are generally satisfied with the order of things to which they are accustomed. If dissatisfaction rises to a significant stage beyond promise of remedy, they are likely to act individually and exit.[14] For minor dissatisfactions seen as correctible, small-scale mobilization is a likely alternative. This tier encompasses NIMBY politics. It is a matter of actors narrowly focused on a small arena of interaction. In relation to the city overall, the mid-level of a governing order calls only for small scale tinkering. It is the epitome of a pattern *Who Governs?* describes in this way: "control over any given issue-area gravitates to the small group which happens to have the greatest interest in it" (1961, 191). Such matters typically have to do with a narrow niche of city life. Middle-class parents, for example, support the program at the school their children attend so long as the principal and her/his staff are perceived as competent and not attached to a misguided policy.[15] If there is a mobilization to replace a principal who falls short, this is only a matter of a minute adjustment in the general arrangement of things. Scope of issue and resource capacity are in balance. They fit the logic of the situation.

Establishing a priority agenda.

Contrast the largely unaltered structure of the situation generally surrounding the mid-level order with the massive disturbance that goes with pursuing a far-reaching agenda of change.   In Dahl's New Haven, while the metal-houses controversy was NIMBY politics, the city's redevelopment program called forth a different magnitude of change and yielded a fundamentally altered situation and a new set of relationships (1961). Dahl saw New Haven's executive-centered coalition backing redevelopment as something extraordinary. He tellingly quotes Mayor Lee:

We've got the biggest muscles, the biggest set of muscles in New Haven on the top C.A.C. [Citizens Action Commission] … They're muscular because they control wealth, they're muscular because they control industries, represent banks. They're muscular because they head up labor. They're muscular because they represent the intellectual portions of the community. They're muscular because they are articulate, because

they're respectable, because of financial power, and because of the accumulation of prestige which they have built up over the years as individuals in all kinds of causes, whether United Fund, Red Cross or whatever (1961:130) .

Robert Salisbury captured the same phenomenon for a wide range of cities in his article spotlighting a "new convergence of power," a convergence that came about in many post World War II cities to adapt to economic and technological change (1964).[16] This is terrain thoroughly examined in the existing literature on urban politics. Pursuing a far-reaching agenda is of a different order from a minor adjustment in an ongoing arrangement, and, as happened in New Haven and many other places, it coincided with a shifting racial demography and a fundamentally different pattern of residential life. Top-level elites were typically little engaged with the issue of residential change (see, for example, Seligman (2005), and, when they were, their grasp of it was often superficial (see, for example, Levine and Harmon1992).

In the face of a shifting demography, middle-level efforts by modest-income households proved ineffective and fed into large-scale exodus. Whether the attraction of suburban opportunities (Self 2003) or "white flight" (Kruse 2005), or a combination of both, the adjustment to change was profound and involved a large proportion of the nation's city population, but it was an instance of uncoordinated actions by individual households, not an act of governing within the city.[17] By contrast, redevelopment in New Haven (with urban renewal and expressway construction as the center pieces) involved intentional action of a different order. Lee's "biggest muscles" and Salisbury's "convergence of power" constituted something not accessible to most city residents. It was a different tier of politics, often kept beyond the reach of ordinary citizens (Friedland and Palmer 1984).

For ordinary citizens, empowerment can involve escape to a different governing jurisdiction. In the postwar years white exodus from the city had a large-scale effect; it was a vast move to what many saw as a more homogenous, congenial, and stable situation, free of major disruptions. The behavior of ordinary citizens can have a profound impact, but impact does not equal governing. While the consequences of demographic shifts were far-reaching, exit is not governing.

For those engaged in making major policy changes, setting a high-priority city agenda is quite unlike Kingdon's view of the congressional arena (1995); establishing a priority agenda for a city is not a fortuitous convergence of problem, solution, and "political climate." It is not about lining up votes to secure a legislative enactment but rather about building a sustainable coalition able to draw on substantial and varied resources. Few actors have the ability to engage in the construction of a governing coalition; most therefore find themselves unable to have a part in giving the city a strategic direction. Establishing a top priority as a locality's governing agenda is simply not available to most people. A populace might mobilize on a scale able to veto a given expressway, but that falls short of being able to set a priority agenda. Baltimore residents,

for instance, were better able than residents in some other cities to alter their city's expressway plan (Mohl 2004), but not to create an alternative agenda. Despite an eventual veto of a proposed expressway leg in a section of west Baltimore, residents found themselves divided by "a highway to nowhere" and unable to put in motion a positive plan of change. Neighborhood resources could not match the policy effort such a shift in transportation planning would entail.

As shown in Dahl's classic work, launching New Haven's redevelopment program called not only for the creation of a "muscular" Citizens Action Commission, but also the ability to tap abundant resources through intergovernmental and philanthropic channels. As *Who Governs?* illustrates, external funding allowed Mayor Lee to establish a redevelopment office directly subject to his control, in this way bypassing the Board of Aldermen. Staffed by professionals of the mayor's choosing, the office operated outside the city's traditional patronage politics. New Haven's arrangement insulated the program from popular pressure, and it made possible a profound restructuring of land-use in the city (Fainstein and Fainstein 1986; Rae 2003). In short, agenda setting is a level of politics inaccessible to those with modest resources. They can escape the city, but not set the city's strategic priorities.

Today's city residents face continuing change, but for manyresidents it is on a less massive scale. Notably there has been little by way of a revived "convergence of power." in today's post-redevelopment era of city politics. There are some big issues: among them, remaking urban education,[18] seeking to attract the "creative class,"[19] and revamping the approach to policing.[20] None, however, matches the redevelopment agenda in scope and sustained effort

The politics of marginality as an empowerment puzzle.

The urban poor face a long list of problems. These range from unemployment to scarce retail outlets, from illicit drug trafficking and youth violence to illegal dumping and other environmental challenges. Public services are woefully inadequate. Policing may be flawed by profiling, instances of brutality, and insufficient patrolling in some areas. Schools serving marginal populations often fall short in the extent to which faculty possess experience and essential professional credentials,[21] Even those with paper qualifications may be weak performers who have been systematically placed in schools that serve lower-income populations.[22] Extra-school programs for children and youth are in short supply and those in operation chronically struggle with underfunding

Inner city populations are especially susceptible to displacement by the construction of new infrastructure or changing development strategies (on the latter, see Mele 2000; and Marwell 2007). Relocation programs are seldom adequate and frequently hampered by poor record keeping. Complicating the housing situation over a wide span of years, predatory lending is no recent phenomenon; it long predates the recent foreclosure crisis.[23]

For the marginal these are particular ways that exploitation and neglect bear on their lives. They are ways that come about as a consequence of inequalities emanating from racial stereotyping, a rationing of legal residence, and especially a scarcity of success in a market economy. As historian Robert Halpern puts it, the underlying source of inner-city problems is to be "found in the primacy of the marketplace in defining people's worth and entitlement and in shaping social relations, in a limited sense of social obligation, particularly toward the poor and minorities …" (1995, 228). It comes, Halpern argues, from a weak society-wide framework of mutual interest and responsibility (1995, 229). Established patterns in the every-day life of the community (what Norton Long once called "an ecology of games" [1958]), often take shape around the low regard for those in society's lower echelon. Those in the mainstream tend to regard those on the margin as unworthy of special concern. Consequently those at the bottom bear the burden of vulnerability and powerlessness. The frustrations they encounter are not occasional departures from an expected norm; these conditions are the norm. As problems interweave, they appear less and less amenable to change. The resource requirement to alter established patterns magnifies, and thus becomes less and less attainable.

While the urban literature has given much attention to coalition building at the top, less analysis has gone to the political challenge faced by marginal populations.[24] From the perspective of those in society's lower strata, established relationships are far from being benign. Moreover, the severity of the problems faced and their tendency to be interlaced are too great. When highly particular mobilizations occur, even when they succeed in the short term, they are often engulfed and largely lost in the interwoven conditions that call for a wide scope of intervention.

Unlike the situation of the broad middle strata, those in society's lower ranks have little reason to be content with their situation. But, unlike the upper strata they lack the resources to pursue wide-ranging change. Within the logic of my threefold schema, their anemic resources put them in a situation of discontent without a capacity to act governmentally on their condition.[25] The logic of their situation thus involves some built-in frustration and instability.

Many lower-income people, especially those deeply mired in marginality, tend toward non-participation,[26] but that is by no means a structural given (Small 2004). Marginality spawns an erratic pattern, in contrast with the more predictable pattern in the upper and middle levels of the political order. As conflict theory has long recognized, there is an underlying foundation for resentment and deep-running opposition to the status quo. It breaks through occasionally, but is subject to countermeasures (Katz 2011). The brokers between the mainstream and the marginal can play a role (Pattillo 2007), but they may see a self-serving bird in the hand as worth more than a flock of long-term possibilities of community improvement in the bush.

The oft-cited success story in struggles against marginality is the civil rights movement, but it was national in scope, it involved bringing all branches of the federal government into play

as well as various forms of philanthropic assistance, and it benefited from years of building local networks of action and support (Morris1984; and McAdam 2000). Even so, success was incomplete at the city level, where class divisions persist.[27] Today's political environment offers little prospect of comprehensive federal enlistment in an effort to address conditions of urban marginality. Still, local protests, outbreaks of discontent in hearings, and scattered surges of dissatisfaction are in evidence, and some give voice to policy hopes and aspirations. But from the past the repeated story for the lower strata is one of blocked entry to the circle of governing power.[28]

What to make of this pattern? Lesson one is that the local is still important (Sugrue 2003). Even the pursuit of regional economic development has turned to greater reliance on local activity (Katz and Bradley 2013). Close examination of local experiences is thus fruitful. Lesson two is that the resource-adequacy/scope-of-issue model points to an unstable mix when it comes to the lower strata in the city.[29] As predicted, this mix works against sustained mobilization around a substantial agenda of change, but repeated outcroppings of activity, anger-filled public hearings, and far-reaching calls for more responsive governance show clearly that periods of outward passivity are only surface level. Underneath, resentment and frustration persist.

However, by the end of the 1970's the intensity of discontent lessened. As a changing demography took shape, black-white conflict became less immediate and what Michael Katz calls "selective incorporation" brought increasing numbers of African Americans into public office-holding and employment (Katz 2011, 84, 86).[30] This selective incorporation did offer "limited ladders of mobility" (2011, 87), but left underlying problem unresolved , especially those impinging most heavily on the poor and near poor. What does the post-industrial city of the present time hold? Are there prospects of change, or is the limited empowerment pattern of the past locked in?

Second Step: The Hybrid Politics of Social Reconstruction

What does a recent scan of experiences bring into view? For the lowervstrata there are several potentially bright spots, but they are somewhat limited in scope and take a less than fully understood hybrid form. [31] Consider this list: the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) in Boston (Medoff and Sklar 1991; Clavel 2010); the University of Pennsylvania's community development program, (Rodin 2007); the Harlem Children's Zone (Tough 2008; Hanson 2013); Hampton Virginia's human-capital agenda (Stone and Worgs 2004; Sirianni 2009; Osborne and Plastrik 1998); El Paso's Collaborative for Academic Excellence (Stone 2005); Boston's youth anti-violence campaign (Berrien and Winship 2002; Kennedy 2002; Pruit 2001); San Francisco's Children's Amendment (McLaughlin et al 2009; Stone 2011); Seattle's neighborhood program (Diers 2004; Sirianni 2009); Chicago's New Communities Program funded by the MacArthur Foundation; in Baltimore Bon Secours Hospital and OROSW (Davies and Pill 2012; and Stoker,

Stone, and Worgs 2011); the Central Baltimore Partnership (Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2013); and East Baltimore (discussed below). This is not offered as a definitive list, nor is it a random selection from such a list.[32]

Though three of the initiatives come from Baltimore, the list is varied in geography and in policy focus and can convey something of the range of experiences. None offers a pure case of bottom-up mobilization. DSNI comes closest, but even it took shape in response to a foundation community-development initiative that the Riley Foundation was willing to turn into support for organizing. All are hybrids that include an important role for players that bring resource-bearing contributions to the initiative. Some such as the University of Pennsylvania's community-development program are clearly top-down. At least one, the Harlem Children's Zone traces to the efforts of an individual program entrepreneur, and it has involved substantial foundation support from the beginning. A key foundation role runs through over half of these initiatives. Local government also figures prominently in a majority of the initiatives. Universities have a major role in at least four of the initiatives.

It should also be recognized that only three of these initiatives operate city-wide: San Francisco's Children's Amendment, Seattle's neighborhood program, and Hampton's human-capital agenda. Some initiatives involve a single neighborhood; several extend to multiple neighborhoods but are not city-wide in coverage. The smallest city on the list, Hampton, is notable for its very broad human-capital agenda.

As argued in a book in progress (Stone, Stoker, and others), post-industrial cities in the present era do not involve the kind of large-scale makeover that so many places experienced in the redevelopment period.[33] Nor do most cities today have governing coalitions comparable to Salisbury's (then) "new convergence of power." Many corporate businesses have loosened their ties to the local scene, especially central cities (Hanson, Wolman, and others 2010). The ed & med sector has risen in prominence, but brings no solidarity among civic and business elites of the kind the corporate sector once fostered. The joined business-city hall pursuit of physical redevelopment has given way to a more open-ended agenda, but now there is also less cohesion among elite players. As indicated in the brief scan above, in many cities the philanthropic sector has taken a more active part in governing and thereby added to the variety of resource-rich players.

All in all, the initiatives listed above are modest in scope, but still for at least some areas of the city they amount to more than narrow tinkering.[34] The infusion of resources from players other than the lower strata enables policy action that could not come from marginal players alone. More needs to be known about these hybrid instances of governing. In the above list DSNI is an instance in which the lower strata clearly have a voice of their own. For most of the remainder, up-to-date details I can command are too sketchy for me to make a fine-grained assessment. However, recent research on East Baltimore provides a closer look at one of the more substantial forms of hybrid policy action and what it may hold.

<u>Empowerment in East Baltimore</u>.

Baltimore continues to bear the scars of deindustrialization, and they are especially deep in the East Baltimore section with its long history as one of city's trouble spots.[35] For this heavily African American community, disinvestment and depopulation remain as major problems even as redevelopment is in process. The area is not only near the center of the city, but it also includes the medical campus of the Johns Hopkins University. As the largest private employer in the state of Maryland, Hopkins is a central player with multiple interests at issue. Stake-holding in East Baltimore is thus no light matter. The area was a prime location for urban renewal in that program's run. Later it was part of the city's Empowerment Zone.

During the mayoralty of William Donald Schaefer, city hall made use of its power of appointment to exercise influence. East Baltimore kingpin, Clarence "Du" Burns, became president of the city council in a move largely engineered by Mayor Schaefer (McDougall 1993, 97), and Burns succeeded to the mayoralty for a short term when Schaefer vacated city hall for the governor's office. East Baltimore thus has thus had a long presence in Baltimore politics, but its residents have not been a force in governing the city. In 1987 there was a potential for a change. Kurt Schmoke became the city's first popularly elected black mayor; Schmoke's platform called for greater attention to the city's neighborhoods, as did a newly released report to the Goldseker Foundation.[36]

As Baltimore was entering the later years of the 20th century, various changes brought Baltimore into a new era of emerging post-industrial politics. The Greater Baltimore Committee, for many years at the center of the city's economic and civic life, had ceased to be a major force in the city (Hanson, Wolman and others 2010), and, instead, the philanthropic and ed & med sectors came to occupy center stage.[37] These were players well off, but not tied to a narrow version of economic development. The city's priorities became more open-ended than they had been when Baltimore entered its redevelopment era, following World War II. On the city's west side, in this new era, James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation took on a major project, Sandtown-Winchester. East Baltimore's fate was tied closely to Hopkins, particularly its medical campus.

Growing out of a portion of the Empowerment Zone, the university and community residents came together in HEBCAC (Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition) for the purpose of addressing decline on the eastern side of the city. However, a neighborhood-based CDC proved unable to gain enough ground to outpace continuing residential disinvestment. With the election of Martin O'Malley as mayor (1999, at the end of Schmoke's three terms), the scene was set for a new start. Events internal to Johns Hopkins University were also opening a fresh channel with the community. For his part, O'Malley called for a new and ambitious effort in East Baltimore, combining community development with economic development centered on promoting lab and office space for the biomedical industry. With Hopkins and the Annie Casey Foundation joining the effort, a new entity, EBDI (East Baltimore Development Inc.) was born, replacing HEBCAC. EBDI is a public-private partnership with its

own autonomous board, but with sparse community representation.[38] In several anger-filled meetings, the community gave voice to long-standing grievances and expressed its worries about the future. As a condition of its participation, the Annie Casey Foundation insisted on a "new paradigm" in which special attention and extra funding would be given to relocated households. The launch promised a different approach to redevelopment, but came under heavy criticism from the beginning. Transparency and community engagement have proved to be weak elements throughout EBDI's history.

While there is no typical initiative of governing through hybrids, East Baltimore brought together relatively rich resource players (Hopkins and the philanthropic sector), a lower strata residential community organized in various configurations over time (including churches active individually and in coalition, various service-providing organizations, and an Eastside Democratic club).[39] As elites sought to bring the community around to supporting EBDI, an agenda took shape that called for several benefits to the community: enlarged employment opportunities, minority contracts, a new K-8 school designed to serve East Baltimore, an early childhood center, and the prospects of an expanded retail presence in the area. Separate from EBDI, Hopkins created an Urban Health Institute to provide a new interface with the community as part of a restart in university-community relations.

In implementation EBDI has encountered multiple problems. It involved clearing 88 acres for redevelopment. The initial plan called for five office-and-laboratory towers to serve the biomedical industry and provide a range of employment opportunities. As the first was being completed, the Great Recession brought the message that five buildings was an unattainable goal; one may be the limit. Re-planning was necessary, but, as with the initial plan, community engagement was limited. When the new plan (now including a hotel and a state public-health laboratory as well as an expanded park area) was presented at a public meeting, protesting residents closed down the event. The following year (2012), as the K-8 school, the state public-health laboratory, and housing were under construction, a new wave of protests hit, this time focused on the absence of construction jobs for residents, This protest was led by a group of churches loosely allied with the Laborers International Union of North America (mainly representing day laborers), but the complaints widened to include concern about promised commitments to contracts for minorities, women, and local businesses as well as a continuing failure to include the community in the development of plans.

Concurrent with these protests a local newspaper ran a highly critical series on EBDI, raising questions about its complex financial arrangements and the lack of oversight from the city. At this stage EBDI had spent $200 million in public funds, including $78 million in TIF (Tax Increment Financing) bonds, which EBDI had arranged with minimal involvement by city hall. Reporters learned that the mayor knew almost nothing about the details of the project, financial and other. City council members from the immediate area were knowledgeable only about minority contracts (the Maryland Minority Business Association is the watchdog group, and it has hired former mayor Sheila Dixon to monitor the process).

The problem of transparency runs deep. It is not clear that EBDI's board makes the key decisions. An informal, off-the record process seems to be in command. The project and its financing are complicated (mixing support from federal, state, and city governments, multiple foundations and Johns Hopkins University along with pitches to the market for private investment). The new school has emerged as a spotlighted feature of the project, but its oversight is unclear. The school is a "contract school," meaning that it is part of the city system but has the autonomy of a charter school. The first principal was recruited by a consulting firm that also provided a curriculum. Not quite two years into her appointment, the principal was quietly notified that her contract would not be extended. Without any public discussion, EBDI announced that the school of education of Johns Hopkins would take over control of the school and rely on a new curriculum. Morgan State University (a historically black institution) would be in charge of community engagement. No details were released.

With the biomedical development scaled back, the school took center stage.   The new school is located within the EBDI redevelopment area on a seven-acre site, which is housing the early childhood center as well as the school and park grounds. The school is also designed to serve as a community center. Quietly another change took shape. Initially named the East Baltimore Community School (with enrollment confined to residents of the immediate area and the children of those who worked in the area),[40] the newly opening school is now named the Henderson-Hopkins school (officially the Elmer A. Henderson School: A Johns Hopkins Partnership School).[41]   Enrollment eligibility became less clear, and the renaming was plainly an important symbolic move that diminished the identification of the area with East Baltimore. None of the various school-related actions was subject to public deliberation or systematic community engagement,

Despite the fact that EBDI provides substantial benefits to the community, its relationship to East Baltimore has been friction-laden and protest-ridden. Even with numerous concessions along the way added to the benefits incorporated into the original plan, the relationship has remained a troubled one. Partly because the area has suffered from population loss over many years—a factor accelerated but not initiated by clearance of 88 acres for redevelopment, East Baltimore has had no steady form of advocacy and representation in its dealings with EBDI.[42] Instead there has been a succession of community-based organizations, some of which had only a brief presence on the scene. Though the specifics of its agenda have shifted over time, EBDI as an organization has been a steady institutional force. Seen as partners in a hybrid policy arrangement, EBDI and the East Baltimore community are totally imbalanced in resources afforded and in organizational heft.

The arrangement in East Baltimore contrasts sharply with Boston's highly regarded Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative. Nothing community-based in East Baltimore matches the kind of autonomy and institutional stability DSNI has. East Baltimore has not had even a steady voice.   The community's civic character is too fragmented and ad hoc to foster an effective partnership. As a complex arrangement with low transparency, EBDI offers no

effective channel of accountability to the community it has so thoroughly altered. And the community lacks an ability to negotiate an agreement that is both lasting and effectively monitored by residents.

The East Baltimore story has another significant chapter. EBDI is only one part of the relationship of Johns Hopkins University to its surrounding community. As a hybrid policy form, EBDI stands in contrast to the university's Urban Health Institute. As far back as the 1960s, Hopkins was developing "a plan for improving the health, social and economic climate for East Baltimore residents" (Johns Hopkins Urban Health Institute 2010: 2). These plans were suspended after the 1968 rioting. Planning resumed in the 1970s, but was largely stymied by a conflict with residents over control of community-based health initiatives. Mistrust has continued to be an issue.

In the late 1990s, subsequent to the inauguration of a new president at Hopkins, a small group of faculty members (from Medicine, Nursing, and Public Health) went to the president with an argument that the fate of Hopkins is intertwined with the community and the university needed to become more deeply engaged with the community. Starting in 1999 (essentially post HEBCAC but prior to the birth of EBDI), a two-year planning and consultation process yielded a new entity, the Urban Health Institute (UHI). Housed in, funded by, and ultimately controlled by Hopkins, UHI "was conceptualized as a partnership between Johns Hopkins institutions, the East Baltimore community, government and business" (Johns Hopkins Urban Health Institute 2010: 4).[43] UHI defines its special target as the five zip codes that surround the Hopkins medical complex, and it works with an active and vocal advisory committee representing this community. In consultation with this advisory group, UHI is currently putting into place TAP (The Access Partnership)—an initiative to provide the full range of health care to uninsured and underinsured residents in this catchment area.[44] UHI has also played a leading role in establishing the early childhood center.

A Community-University Collaboration Committee is UHI's major connection with the surrounding residents, but UHI also takes additional measures such as sponsorship of a variety of seminars and workshops, participation in a series of ongoing Community-Faith-Hopkins Forums, and arranging for special sessions such as the "roundtable briefings" for newly installed President Ronald Daniels with community representatives. The committee is advisory, but not light weight. The provost regularly attends meetings and involves himself with UHI. In the spirit of being a partnership entity, UHI also works with the city's Department of Health and on various initiatives with the mayor's office.

UHI's relation to the community has not been conflict free. A self study openly acknowledged distrust between the community and the university. In 2006 in proposing a community health assessment, UHI encountered anger, distrust, and resentment (particularly over what residents saw as an undue emphasis on problems and a neglect of community strengths and assets). In response UHI brought in outside consultants to restore lines of

communication and facilitate forward movement on the assessment. A major breakthrough in relations occurred when Hopkins closed its part-time community clinic and replaced it with The Access Partnership. Starting with two of the zip codes adjoining the Hopkins medical campus, the program is now extended to all five adjacent zip-codes the medical campus regards as its prime target area. Under this program *all* under-insured and uninsured residents can receive full medical care through Hopkins, not just on an emergency basis but also including treatment for such chronic needs as hip-replacement surgery. (Johns Hopkins Medicine, "Expanding the Boundaries," November 2009). Hopkins also runs a Community Health Worker Program, which provides training for residents to qualify for a variety of occupations. UHI has, as well, played a vital role in making the early childhood center a reality. All in all, after traveling a bumpy road, UHI has developed a constructive and multifaceted relationship with East Baltimore.

EBDI's institutional backing is broader than Johns Hopkins University, but the Hopkins stake in EBDI is still quite large—and different from UHI. The two entities together show that no single factor governs university-community relations. The two represent quite different versions of hybrid participation in governing. The creation and operation of UHI shows an altruistic side of the university, an acknowledgement of its responsibility as an eleemosynary institution. In addition, parts of the medical faculty especially need to have a positive relationship with the surrounding community. By contrast, EBDI is closely linked to issues of land use, and brings ambivalence into its relation to lower-income residents.[45]

UHI and EBDI also represent quite different institutional interfaces with the community. UHI has a direct relationship, which is soft in that its formal connection to the community is advisory, but this relationship is quite straightforward. Differences between the university and the community cannot be hidden from view, and the cultural gap between the two is hard to conceal as a potential barrier in communications and interactions. UHI openly recognizes the problem, and acknowledges that the community has taken to task the university for displaying "a badge of advantage" and coming across as "arrogant."[46]

As a complex organizational maze, lacking in regular channels of interaction with the community, EBDI provides a notable contrast. Token representation on a governing board offers little but disguises much. Even when the Annie Casey Foundation was funding the advocacy group, SMEAC, EBDI still held the community at arm's length. By contrast UHI's advisory committee and other activities bring community representatives into deliberations at an early stage.

A public-private partnership, EBDI is a replica of a long-time Baltimore form of governing, buffered from popular pressures (Lyall 1982; Stoker 1987). It is a form in which those with significant resources to bring into play place their confidence in professionals accustomed to navigating the pathways of complex organizations and using the largely technical language of policymaking. As a mode of organization, it has no place for worries about

displaying "a badge of advantage" and coming across as "arrogant." It is structured to see that professionally managed development can move along with minimal community involvement

Assessment.

As East Baltimore demonstrates, empowerment is not simply a matter of mobilizing slack resources; the terms on which players interact are of the essence. The story of East Baltimore contains two distinctly different narratives. One centers on UHI, an entity created and overseen by the university and is connected to the community mainly by an advisory body, the Community University Coordinating Committee, but also by various events open to the voice of the community. For example, in 2009 UHI began sponsoring Reverse Research Days in which city agencies and community-based organizations present research needs they have to the academic community. Despite a shaky start in working with community representatives, UHI has achieved a stable and constructive relationship as marked in particular by The Access Project and its provision of comprehensive health care to under-insured and uninsured residents in a targeted area around the medical campus. UHI has also been a prominent backer of the early childhood center, now nearing completion in the EBDI project area.

The other narrative centers on EBDI, the public-private partnership with its difficult and complicated relationship between the community and the resource-rich partnership of city government, foundations, and Hopkins. The fruits of this coalition include significant benefits but also frustrations. Although depopulation and disinvestment began long before EBDI was launched, displacement through redevelopment has been one source of complaint— despite enriched compensation underwritten by Annie Casey. Residents have also voiced discontent over the limited extent to which they have been engaged in planning and re-planning the project. Inadequate employment opportunities have been a source of significant protests as well.

The two strands of East Baltimore's narrative have grown from quite different connections between the community and resource-rich partners. In the case of UHI the connection is altruistic (while providing a boost in public and community relations)—what can Hopkins do to conform to its position as an eleemosynary institution?[47] Specifically what services could it provide those around it who had great needs and sometimes served as research subjects and sources for training medical professionals. Altruism is thus reinforced by a desire to replace distrust and resentment, especially in areas in which the university would benefit from a cooperative response.

EBDI involves more that Hopkins, and Hopkins has more than an altruistic, trust-building relationship on the line in this initiative. Aside from expansion needs, Hopkins also has a stake in reducing its security costs and developing a less problem-laden community in its immediate environment. EBDI's institutional form brings a further complication into the picture. As an autonomous entity facing a complex task with a self-perpetuating board and its own staff, EBDI lacks the leaven that might come from accountability as a government agency or, as in the case

of UHI, being an arm of the university directly accountable to the authority structure of the university. It is mainly donor-directed.

What explains differences between the two initiatives? Both involve efforts to establish a positive tie to East Baltimore. In its relationship to the community UHI provides only for an advisory connection. Yet it is a link that carries real substance with it, and through UHI Hopkins has shown a willingness to acknowledge that distrust from the community is real and needs to be actively dealt with. By contrast, EBDI offers only a hollow voice for the community in that two of the fifteen board members are community representatives, and the board as an entity involves no specific channel for the community to air its concerns. In fact, the board seems to be mainly a front behind which informal consultations between select elites have made the actual policy decisions. Moreover, EBDI has few informal channels of communication with the community. Whereas UHI takes such steps as arranging community meetings with the newly appointed university presidents, organizing a Reverse Research Day, and taking part in an ongoing series of Community-Faith-Hopkins Forums, EBDI offers no such outreach. When a public meeting was arranged for presenting a revised EBDI plan, the session became unruly as community residents voiced their complaints about exclusion, and EBDI closed the meeting. EBDI has also responded to the critical newspaper series with public rebuttals, but also refused to proceed with a meeting when one of the critical reporters showed up. EBDI has engaged in defensive reactions rather than positive outreach. Where UHI brought in consultants to work through a period of serious friction, EBDI has stonewalled, deciding on its own how to make adjustments.

Contrasting behaviors have roots in deep differences in circumstance.   Consider that the two strands of East Baltimore's narrative grow from contrasting connections between the community and resource-rich partners. In the case of UHI the connection is altruistic (while providing a boost in public and community relations). Specifically what services could it provide those around it who had great needs and who sometimes served as research subjects and sources for training medical professionals.   Altruism is thus reinforced by a desire to replace distrust and resentment.

EBDI involves players other than Hopkins, and Hopkins has more than an altruistic, trust-building relationship on the line in this initiative. Aside from expansion needs Hopkins has a stake in reducing its security costs and developing a less worrisome community in its immediate environment. EBDI's institutional form brings a further complication into the picture. As an autonomous entity facing a complex task with a self-perpetuating board and its own staff, EBDI lacks the leaven that might come from accountability as a government agency or, as in the case of UHI, being an arm of the university accountable to the authority structure of the university.

As hybrid forms of governing, alliances between lower-strata populations and resource-rich entities constitute complex forms of empowerment for those in the lower strata. They suffer the tensions faced by any coalition, and, as illustrated in the case of East Baltimore, these

tensions can be fed by the inequality between the two sides of the alliance. EBDI compounds these tendencies by a structure that is low in transparency and that does little to counter the imbalance between the partners. Quite the opposite, its mode of operation accentuates professionalism and distance from the community. Unlike UHI, EBDI has introduced no special procedure to confront professional "arrogance" as a factor in interactions with the community. Visible activity is most apparent around minority contracting, an issue for which there is an association (Maryland Minority Businesses) with its own advocacy staff. Labor and employment have been a more contentious issue area, but have lacked a stable and lasting form of organization. Empowerment involves not simply; the terms of access to resources also matter greatly. This, however, is an area of city politics too little explored.[48]

Conclusion

I have used a schema of resource capacity and issue scope to sketch different levels of governing. It indicates why empowerment on any significant scale is beyond the bottom ranks of society so long as they are acting on their own. Lower-strata populations confront extensive and intertwined problems, many of which have broad structural roots. Empowerment on a level to contend with such issues is not amenable to momentum built through mobilization around small winnable issues. Without an infusion of a wider body of resources, empowerment efforts are outmatched by the scope of problems faced.

However, as city politics continues to evolve, it is clear that lower-strata groups are not confined to acting on their own. In many places the business role in governing has receded, and local government has the possibility of developing a more open-ended agenda that can bring marginal groups into consideration. Moreover, as the philanthropic and ed & med sectors have come to play a larger part in governing cities, a hybrid form of governing has taken shape. Resulting resources are too modest to allow for a large-scale social reconstruction of the city, but resources can be substantial enough to make a difference in otherwise highly disadvantaged places in the city. A significant degree of empowerment is possible in a coalition arrangement bringing together a body of community residents with a varying mix of coalition partners.

This paper has taken a preliminary look at one instructive instance of a hybrid form of governing. East Baltimore has a long history as an inner-city community of severe disadvantage, but it is not a place outside the attention of elite players. With its close-in location and position encompassing the medical campus of Johns Hopkins University, it occupies strategically important territory.

Much urban research, including my own, has centered on the large, agenda-setting convergence of power that occupied center stage in the era of redevelopment. This is the politics of Dahl's executive-centered coalition (1961), the growth machine of Logan and Molotch (1987), Peterson's developmental politics (1981), Fainstein and others multi-city study of "the

political economy of urban redevelopment" (1986), my own work on Atlanta's biracial coalition (1989), and much more.[49] As interesting and contradictory as these various analyses might be, they don't fit the contemporary world of city politics very well. They are about a period in which two major centers of power, city hall and a collectively mobilized business sector, came together (aided by ample federal funding) to take on a fundamental remaking of the city physically and economically. Today, however, this transformation has in the main occurred. With its rail- and harbor-centered form, the industrial city is largely a phenomenon of the past (Rae 2003).

There is now a far-reaching need for the social reconstruction of cities, but no convergent powers, backed by federal funds, have come together to pursue such an agenda. Such an agenda exists only in bits and pieces, not in comprehensive form. Much smaller and narrower initiatives populate today's urban political landscape. Because needed resources are not readily available in society's lower ranks (this is to say, at that level the logic of the situation is too confining), a bottom-up transformation holds little promise. Though cities and metropolitan areas house significant resources and valuable expertise (Katz and Bradley 2013),[50] they show little tendency to "converge," especially around an agenda of social reconstruction.

As in the earlier time of massive redevelopment, society's lower strata face the challenge of how they can have a voice in governing. What empowerment strategy is available to them? With its strategy of building on winnable issues, community organizing does not carry the task of social reconstruction very far (Santow 2007).[51] It has the built-in limitation of a narrow resource base. Participation in a hybrid form of governing provides a less constrained approach in that it expands access to resources. However, hybrids offer no assurance that the lower-strata will have a significant voice in governing the city. In addition to local government itself as a potential partners in a hybrid form of governing, the philanthropic and ed & med sectors open up possibilities—not of social reconstruction on a large scale, but as pathways to provide significant pockets of social reconstruction and islands of community engagement. Conceivably these could be knit together to constitute a greater national presence, and certainly a greater regional presence (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009).

The key puzzle to be solved is one of how to put together hybrids in such a way that the lower-strata voice is not muffled, but instead that marginal groups reach a level of engagement that is both sustained and significant. This is not a matter of taking part in an occasional hearing or charette. An urgent social-reform aim is to see that voices of the marginal become a real and sustained part of city-level governing. Earlier the lower strata were excluded from a policy role in the period of physically remaking the city, and the result was lasting social damage. The present time is one in which there are numerous (though limited in scale) initiatives of social reconstruction. In the current period we should not repeat the earlier failure to be inclusive. Given the central importance of resources, in the absence of substantial federal support it is difficult to make full problem-solving empowerment feasible. However, perhaps there are now enough cases to enable us to draw together a body of empowerment lessons. What East

Baltimore residents call the arrogance of the advantaged should not go unaddressed. Finding ways of taming it should be high on the urban agenda of the future.

There are, however, structural constraints. Historian Robert Halpern leans toward the pessimistic view that not much can be done. Certainly he makes a strong case that piecemeal efforts don't work, and more widely he sees a growth in what he terms the "difference dilemma." He contends:

> What little common life—in beliefs, norms, identity, aspirations, physical contact—once existed between residents of inner-city communities and the larger society around them is gone. The bridges back and forth have almost disappeared. No strategy tried by excluded Americans has worked to resolve this dilemma: neither integration, separate development, self-help, legal action, direct action, militancy, education, social services, community development, collective violence (1995, 230).

However, Mario Luis Small offers a counter perspective of a "conditional approach" (2004, 182-187). Structural forces are sufficiently loose in immediate impact as to allow for building what might be termed a sub-ecology in which mutually reinforcing parts form a bulwark of opportunity expansion and protection against the wider forces of exclusion and confined opportunity. The empowerment puzzle is how to bring about a change on a scale that makes a difference when the most adversely affected population has resources sufficient only for narrow issue struggles. A change in the situation of marginalized city residents requires a substantial modification of arrangements in place; otherwise narrow policy efforts quickly erode in the face of seemingly implacable structural forces.

In East Baltimore's experience we can see that, as a strategy for the social reconstruction of the city, hybrid mobilization carries with it multiple risks. Mobilization can be carried out in a manner that is too one-sided to constitute empowerment of the lower-strata population.[52] As a community, East Baltimore, for instance, was too fragmented to bring together an effective way of interacting with EBDI. In writing about marginal people both Cathy Cohen (1999) and Mario Luis Small (2004) have called attention to the importance of such intermediate factors as level of organization within the lower-strata, intra-group links and communication, and the development of civic skills among the marginal.[53] Boston's Dudley Street Initiative exemplifies how a policy effort can serve as a channel of empowerment by actively engaging the community and allowing for a genuine process of community development. But Baltimore's EBDI shows that empowerment can be essentially missing even when substantial benefits are involved. The particulars of structuring arrangements matter enormously.

Even given altruistic motives by those who bring substantial resources to their interactions with a marginal population, the relationship can be colored by perceptions of elite arrogance and air of superiority. In short, it is hard to escape the consequences of structural

inequality. Showing the marginal that they are valued partners is no easy accomplishment, but it is nonetheless a task that needs to be taken up.

Another risk is that hybrid mobilizations will be seen as tokenism. Michael Katz has cautioned that social reconstruction can amount to no more than superficial reform (2011, 87). If so, he suggests that it is more accurately seen as part of a strategy of indirect rule rather than as a contributor to empowerment.

Looking too narrowly at particular hybrid mobilizations carries with it the additional risk of missing the key elements of intergovernmental relations and the part that national policies play.   The "convergence of power" observed by Salisbury enjoyed crucial support from federal programs. Without that funding, the physical redevelopment of American cities would not have reached the huge scale that it did. Despite the bold rhetoric about "the metropolitan revolution" and the metropolitan region as "the new sovereign," the fine print in the new Brookings book by Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley (2013) indicates that such initiatives as those in regional transportation and biomedical development have a substantial need for federal funding. Moreover if city governments incur further decreases in intergovernmental aid, if universities face diminished research funding, and if foundations find that that they are drawn into a growing need for immediate safety-net measures, then hybrid mobilizations have little prospect for growth and expanded activity. Resources may become too scarce.

Governing the post-industrial city is no mere extension of the past. We should look beyond the kind of big agenda-setting mobilizations of elites that Robert Salisbury so appropriately spotlighted in an earlier era. Indications are that today's priorities are mostly piecemeal. Still, I contend that relatively small hybrid mobilizations have become a significant phenomenon to study. They are no panacea for the problems of the city, and they possess their own distinct set of problems and challenges. Indeed, for that reason they warrant further study well beyond the preliminary look taken here. Though they offer no guarantee, hybrid mobilizations hold a potential for lessening the isolation and neglect that have so long been the fate of marginal populations.

The main argument of this paper leaves open the question of what might claim top priority on the agenda of post-industrial cities. Comprehensive social reconstruction falls far short of such standing. But is there some other realm of change afoot? The recent Brookings book by Katz and Bradley suggests that metropolitan economic development has the potential to command broad and powerful support (2013). Yet, despite some interesting instances of regional cooperation (transportation in the Denver area and advanced manufacturing in northern Ohio), their evidence is less than convincing. Similarly, their call for a new "collaborative" federalism as a source of funding a "metropolitan revolution" is more an expression of hope than a concrete indication that such a move is in process.

An examination of once-celebrated San Diego points to a declining capacity to set a strategic direction (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie 2011). Even though cities vary in particulars, they may also share trends. San Diego's weak cohesion in the business sector and term limits for the office of mayor work against the kind of forward-looking leadership many cities once displayed. A tax-averse political climate at all levels of government is a further impediment. San Diego is not all cities, but it offers useful lessons.

In short, conditions today do not hold much promise of replicating the degree of power convergence that Salisbury found around redevelopment in an earlier era. From various indications, today's alternative appears to be a piecemeal agenda, fragmented both by function and geography. Innovation in policing is one slice of the post-industrial agenda (Zimring 2012). Education reform, especially when foundation funded, is another (Reckhow 2013). As in San Diego, opportunistic economic-development projects remains as an area of city activity, but one that is far short of the federally funded redevelopment agenda. Hybrids take on added significance in light of the absence of an overarching agenda. Change is afoot, but in fragments.

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[1] Salisbury based his analysis on "the big cities in the United States that experienced major growth prior to World War I" (1964, 777).

[2] For an example of a city making such a transition, see work on Hampton, Virginia (Osborne and Plastrik 1998; Stone and Worgs 2004; and Sirianni 2009). For a concise treatment of the evolution of governing in French cities and how different that trajectory is from U.S. cities, see Pinson (2010).

[3] An important landmark of a northern city (Chicago) is Hirsch (1983).

[4] A cross-time analysis built around the examination of neighborhood policy in six North American cities is the core of a book in progress, *In a New Era*, by Stone, Stoker, and others.

[5] For analytical clarity the typology makes a sharp and distinct difference between (2) and (3), but in reality there is a gray area where these two levels shade into one another.

[6] In discussing developmental politics Peterson repeatedly uses the term "consensus" or "consensual," as in "consensual," as in ""consensual patterns of policy formation" (1981, 142. He describes developmental policies as driven by what "benefits the community as a whole" (1981, 142) and as "usually electorally popular" (1981, 145). Developmental policies, according to Peterson, are "praised by many and opposed only by those whose partial interests stand in conflict with community interests" (1981, 41). Significantly, in talking about the selection of policy makers, Peterson turns to the passive voice, suggesting that their decisions represent the vast majority of city residents. Resource capacity does receive consideration when Peterson observes that the preponderance of business actors in developmental policy comes about because they "are the people who are aware of the factors that could help promote the community's economic capacity, and they possess sufficient financial and other resources to influence it" (1981, 141). Still, Peterson argues, developmental policy-makers hold sway by virtue of "persuasion" rather than "social control" (1981, 147). In emphasizing consensus, Peterson does not confront the assessment of urban renewal in the Kerner Commission report (the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968), nor the experience of New Haven (his model of efficient policy-making) when a 1960s hearing by the federal Commission on Urban Problems was greeted by "local hostility," an audience "seething" with discontent, and police stationed strategically in case the "hearing got out of hand" (quoted in Rae 2003, 350).

[7] A second cross-level form of politics is typified by gentrification. Here the interaction is often between middle- and lower-strata groups either making combined policy efforts or contending against one another or sometimes a bit of both. Gentrification constitutes a kind of "betwixt and between" category. It is part individual action, but also a matter that governing actions can encourage or modify, at least the consequences thereof. Elites may also have a hand in the process. (The literature is extensive, but see especially, Freeman 2006; Pattillo 2007; Hyra 2008; and Hyra 2012).

[8] I reject the straw-man position that focusing on city politics means ignoring the wider world. Local arrangements serve to mediate larger forces (Sugrue 2003). Atlanta, for example, is not a city autonomously experiencing the civil rights movement. It is a city through which the movement was mediated, and also a contributor to the larger narrative.

[9] The pluralism of Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* (1961) rests on an assumption that universal suffrage assures that all groups have at the very least a capacity for electoral power they can turn to in order to influence the matters they most care about. A key statement is that "control over any given issue area gravitates to a small group which happens to have the greatest interest in it." Baumgartner and Jones phrase the matter this way: "*The American political system spawns numerous policy subsystems that are characterized by inclusion of the interested and exclusion of the apathetic*" (1993, 238, italics in the original).

[10] Though not employing the term "polity," a classic guide to what it means is V.O. Key's book on southern politics (1949). Early in this work, Key offers a reminder that "the political process extends beyond the operations of those formal mechanisms that we usually call government. Custom, the organization of the economic system, and, now and then, private violence have a role in determining who governs and who gets what" (1949, 4). While Key recognized that change was discernible, his broad canvass highlighted a semi-feudal agrarian economy made feasible by a pervasive system of racial subordination. Thus did politics, economic relations and social relations interweave to form a distinctive way of governing, a distinctive style of southern politics.

[11] Consider how the situation of cities differs from that of the nation as a whole. As political entities, cities more so than the nation as a whole are quite vulnerable to economic and technological change as well as shifts in demography. Research into city politics thus readily leads to consideration of the importance of social and economic factors. But even at the national level a case can be made for a polity approach (Skocpol 1992). Note, however, that studies of national politics rarely start by attempting to capture the impact of social and economic factors on governing, as constituency factors, yes, but not as elements that directly infuse the government. For researchers into American politics at the national level, the constitutional structure of the U.S. seemingly poses an irresistible puzzle of how multiple constituencies divided by varying forms of geography (nationally—filtered through the allocation of electoral-college votes, statewide elections for Senate members, and congressional districts) and varying term lengths (2, 4, and six years + judicial appointments for life) align in governing. The formal governmental-political arrangements of cities are less convoluted but the *immediacy* of impact from changing social and economic factors is greater.

[12] I do not intend to be dismissive of the argument about "bringing the state back in" (Evans, Rueschemryer, and Skocpol 1985) with regard to comparative national politics, but, as indicated in the above note, cities are not nation states writ small. At the city level, the intertwinings of government, society and economy are more immediate.

[13] I make no claim that a schema such as mine can cover every single instance of governing power, but I maintain that it takes us beyond a "blooming, buzzing confusion" of aggregated particulars to highlight major strands and what they entail.

[14] Historically racial barriers have been an obstacle, and extensively so for African Americans. Discrimination has not disappeared but has been reduced to the point that middle-class blacks now have an exit option and have used it widely. Any model is subject to contextual limitations.

[15] Consider a school board member's description of parent involvement in an upper SES area in the Houston school district:

> Most volunteered some time in their neighborhood school. Some … were exceptional. I called them the PTO mothers. They were usually wives of professional men with excellent incomes. Some had professional degrees themselves. They had put their concerns on hold to be full-time homemakers. And as their children grew older, some became practically full-time, unpaid school employees.

> The PTO mothers volunteered time to chaperone students on field trips, assisted teachers in the classroom, worked in the office, and managed events like fall concerts, show choirs, carnivals, auctions, Christmas programs, and fundraising walkathons. Some programs attracted nearly 1,000 parents. These PTO mothers (and sometimes fathers) helped raise $30,000, sometimes up to $100,000, per year for teaching materials, computers, stage curtains, or whatever the school needed….

> These PTO mothers made schools successful. They demanded effective teaching, high academic standards, and strong leadership. They were towers of strength to effective principals. But if principals were ineffective or the bureaucracy did not respond to programmatic or facilities needs, they took action. They called their [school board member], took him out to lunch, organized letter-writing campaigns or circulated petitions. They knew how the system worked, and they got results (McAdams 2000, pp. 60-61).

[16] See also Teaford (1990) withn its coverage of aging industrial cities; and for a concise but penetrating contrast of development politics in eastern and western cities, see Bridges (2010)

[17] Middle-class exodus was, however, a product of policies and practices adopted nationally. See especially, Freund (2007)

[18] For alternative accounts, see Ravitch (2010); and Brill 2011.On the role of foundation funding, see Reckhow (2013).

[19] On the concept, see Florida (2012). For a case example, see the discussion of New York City in Katz and Bradley 2013).

[20] On policing, see the example of Boston's youth anti-violence campaign (Berrien and Winship 2002; Kennedy 2002; and Pruitt 2001.

[21] See. for example, the details on New York City reported as long ago as Kenneth Clark's *Dark Ghetto* (1965), as well as in the frustrating struggle for school desegregation led by the Reverend Milton Galamison (Taylor1997).

[22] Once cynically known in the Washington, DC, school system as "pass the trash."

[23] For a compelling narrative of a long history of the experience in Chicago, see (Satter (2009).

[24] Important exceptions are Cohen and Dawson (1993),Cohen (1999). Wacquant (2008), and Gaffikin, Perry, and Kundu (2011). From an earlier period, see Parenti (1970); and Bachrach and Baratz (1970),

[25] Michael Katz shows how forms of social control can contain an impulse toward collective violence, but he also regards the condition as one that gives rise to individual acts of violence within the lower strata. after serving on the jury in a murder trial, he concluded THAT black men "unable to leave bleak inner-city neighborhoods have turned their rage inward on one another and not, as they did forty or fifty years ago, on the agents and symbols of a politics, culture, and economy that exclude them from first class citizenship" (2011, 17). On the multigenerational, no-exit character of urban poverty, see (Sharkey 2013).

[26] Note Cohen and Dawson (1993). They observe that, in addition to the impact of individual poverty, there is a neighborhood effect. Those from persistently poor neighborhoods have a stronger inclination toward isolation and withdrawal. Multiple considerations come into play (see also Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), but there is a clear effect from living in a city's most impoverished neighborhoods that works against efforts at sustained engagement. Note that even where exceptional mobilizations occur, as in the election of Harold Washington as mayor in Chicago or in the Oakland mobilization led by the Black Panthers, high voter turnout is hard to maintain. In Oakland the peak level of mobilization still fell short of a full turnout and therefore failed to produce an electoral victory (Self 2003).

[27] Details can be seen, for example, in Chicago (Pattillo 2007). For a broad historical treatment see Adolph Reed's *Stirrings in the Jug* (1999).

[28] Occasional intense struggles have broken out. Consider three dating back several decades: the Black Panther effort to carve out a sphere of self-determination and economic power in Oakland (May 1971; and Self 2003), the community-control controversy in Ocean-Hill Brownsville (Podair 2002); and a long, multi-episode struggle to prevent the deterioration of public housing in Baltimore (Williams 2004). Each is quite different from

the other two, but each also constitutes an unsuccessful effort to achieve priority standing and alter governing in the city. All three saw lower-strata mobilization thwarted in some way. None became a sustained effort, though the attempt to improve public housing in Baltimore was a succession of smaller efforts, not a single dramatic clash. It never reached priority standing, and it eventually came to an end with Baltimore's extensive use of HOPE VI and its shortfall in providing replacement housing

Ocean-Hill Brownsville was a battle with a newly empowered teachers union, and the defeat was decisive. The Panther effort did extend over a period of years and at one stage led to the Panther-centered campaigns of Bobby Seale for mayor and Elaine Brown for city council. The campaigns lost and were followed later by the election of a moderate African American as mayor, someone who pursued no challenge to the status quo in economic development. At that point Oakland remained under the council-manager plan with at-large elections for city council members, and voter turnout among lower strata residents declined after the short-lived Panther mobilization. Oakland did undergo change, but over race, not poverty and economic opportunity (Self 2003; and Douzet 2012).

None of the three cases yielded a significant break-through in governing responsive to the lower strata. Whatever change occurred had more to do with a shifting demography than political mobilization. In all three cases the effort from below was rebuffed and thwarted. The cases do, however, point to a broad expression of discontent. Significantly all three cases date back to the peak years of the civil rights movement. Extraordinary in its issue reach, the allies and body of resources it mobilized, and its internal organizational strength, the movement provided a context in which local mobilizations could form around short-term hopes for success. Led by Martin Luther King, the Chicago housing campaign offered a counter lesson that perhaps did not have its full impact until after King's death (Branch 2006; Ralph 1993). On the importance of the strength of internal organizational for marginal populations, see Cohen (1999)

[29] There are numerous instances of lower-strata communities able to mount an issue effort. The threefold scheme of issue scope and resource adequacy holds that such efforts tend to be both narrow and, because oF the problem-laden context, difficult to sustain. Temporary fixes are just that, short-lived. See, for example, Nicole Marwell's account of Bushwick Parents (anchored in Saint Barbara's Catholic Church). Marwell points out that such organizations are totally overwhelmed by such "an enormous apparently intractable challenge" as penetrating the New York City educational bureaucracy in pursuit of school reform (2007, 144). The communty's efforts consisted of such matters as conducting a facilities audit (covering five schools) and a prolonged struggle (at one time bolstered by *New York Times* coverage) gained some improvements in woeful conditions. But Marwell tellingly observes: "Ater all this work … Bushwick Parents still had not made any progress in addressing the academic concerns at the heart of their concerns" (2007, 137). The difference between marginal groups in the lower strata and groups in the broad middle strata is less about scope of activity standing alone than about scope of activity in relation to the depth and complexity of problems in everyday life. Empowerment thus needs to be seen in relation to the depth and complexity of concerns. The lower strata face challenges commensurate with those faced by Salisbury's "convergence of power" but with mobilizable resources no greater than and often less than those of the middle strata as they face only isolated concerns here and there.

[30] Moves by local elites were crucial. In Atlanta, note how that city's business elites shifted from opposition to Mayor Maynard Jackson's program of minority contracting to strong support of the program. The mass-transit referendum also played a large part in bringing about a strategic recalculation of what was needed to make the governing system work smoothly (Stone 1989). On the carryover of the earlier black-white divide, see the telling

observation by Phillip Thompson: "The problem of substantive political and economic reform is not so much fighting wealthy elites—it is about developing the capacity of blacks and white non-elites to unite democratically without asserting the primacy and infallibility of their own perspectives" (2005, 250). In the education arena, see Henig et al, 1999; Orr 1999; and Rich 1996.

[31] Some observers and players (Living Cities, for instance), rely on the term "network" to convey the idea of disparate players coming together. This term has two weaknesses as a means of analyzing city politics. One is that it does not differentiate the role of elite-based governing coalitions from less substantial policy roles. The other is that it does not focus attention on the unequal relationship so central in the hybrid form emphasized here. Navigating inequality is an especially important challenge in city politics. An important move in this direction is Nicole Marwell's *Bargaining for Brooklyn* (2007). Marwell highlights how the behavior of community-level actors connects to wider social and economic relationships (in her term "fields").

[32] My aim with this list is to highlight policy actions that are broader than, for example, church sponsorship of an affordable-housing project. Standing alone, such instances are not much different from narrow tinkering. The dividing line is not always crystal clear, but the listed examples, as the East Baltimore case below illustrates, amount to more than small adjustments. The point of this paper is to offer a preliminary understanding of what is involved when elite actors interact with marginal groups around policies with significant stakes.

[33] Just as a once-dominant political struggle between "good government" reform and patronage-based machines gave way to a convergence of elite forces behind economic development and redevelopment, so has a new era emerged to form the context of today's city politics. On earlier struggles, see Trounstine (2008).

[34] Details are not provided about the process, but Mario Luis Small's *Villa Victoria* (2004) is about a grass roots mobilization that helped bring about a transformation in a public housing project in Boston. Such instances are numerous enough to warrant separate attention. Failures to achieve are also numerous. F or instance, the Washington, DC replacement of Temple Courts public housing project (described as "a 10-floor, trash-strewn tower") with a promised mixed-income community that preserved 530 units of low-income housing has so far yielded a parking lot. As a one-time resident, who had hoped to return to the community, said: "We just never seemed like a priority" (quoted in Samuels 2013). Attempts to bring about mixed-income communities through HOPE VI have had limited success in bringing lower-income residents into rebuilt areas (Engdahl 2009a; Crowley 2009).

[35] This section draws heavily on an ongoing study of the community, reported most recently in Stoker, Stone, and Worgs (2013). From a community-organizing perspective see also Gomez (2013),

[36] The latter years of the 20th century saw a sharp rise in the prominence of local foundations in the civic life of Baltimore. The following are the dates when various philanthropic entities appeared on the city scene: Baltimore Community Foundation, launched in 1972; Goldseker Foundation, formed in 1975; Association of Baltimore Area Grantmakers (ABAG), came together in 1983; Associated Black Charities (ABC), formed in 1985; Abell Foundation, fully funded in 1986; Enterprise in Baltimore Foundation, founded in 1986 (by Baltimore native James Rouse); Annie E. Casey Foundation, moved to Baltimore in 1994; Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC), an affinity group of ABAG, formed in 1995; and the Weinberg Foundation, major reorganization and refocus in 2005.

[37] The retreat of business elites as a collective force does not mean that developers, commercial real estate companies, and related business interests were out of the picture. Quite the contrary, they may have found themselves with more operating room individually.

[38] The EBDI board is one indication of who has influence over the project. The board has 15 voting members: five come from the philanthropic sector, two are public officials, two are affiliated with Johns Hopkins University, and four come from the corporate sector, and the remaining two are community representatives. In addition there are three ex officio members: the two city council members representing the area plus the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development, presumably representing the mayor.

[39] Once EBDI was taking shape, a new community-based organization, SMEAC (Save Middle East Action Committee) was formed to represent the affected residents. As expressed by one of its members, it was an advocacy organization and "not a puppet organization of Johns Hopkins, political leaders, or foundations" (Gomez 2013, 76). It did, however, receive funding from the Annie Casey Foundation, but that did not appear to diminish its role of advocacy.

[40] With extensive clearance the school faced a potential under-enrollment problem, and the eligibility criteria were modified accordingly. The K-8 school in its new facility has an enrollment capacity of 540; the early childhood center has a capacity of 180.

[41] Elmer Henderson was a prominent black educator in the distant era before the city schools were desegregated. As a contract school, Henderson Hopkins is part of the city school, but has the autonomy accorded charter schools. It is owned by East Baltimore Community Schools Inc., an independent nonprofit corporation with a board composed of "parent, community, foundation, and institutional representation."

[42] Property acquisitions by Hopkins were a long-standing grievance even before EBDI was created, and the university has been careful to stay clear of any direct ownership or leasing relationship on EBDI's 88 acres.

[43] The UHI Director is answerable to the University Provost and thus the President. The UHI Director is charged to work with a Community-University Collaborating Committee (CUCC). The Provost regularly attends the monthly meetings of CUCC, and in 2009 newly inaugurated President Ronald Daniels met with an invited group of East Baltimore community representatives in two days of facilitated briefings to reaffirm the university's commitment to community engagement and to hear the concerns of the East Baltimore community.

[44] Formally this program came from the recommendation of Hopkins East Baltimore Community Clinic Task Force, and follows the closing of the Caroline Street Clinic for the Uninsured. It makes available the full services of the Hopkins Hospital and Medical School

[45] In EBDI's operation, the Annie Casey Foundation has been the stalwart champion of greater attention to lower-income residents, especially those faced with displacement. Casey has provided additional funding so that replacement housing could be purchased at market value when that amount exceeded the acquisition compensation going to the owner. Casey has also provided services to those going through resettlement, and has insisted on close monitoring of the relocation process.

[46] These are terms found in UHI's "Self-Study and External Evaluation" (2010, 32), where they identify a condition to be concerned about.

[47] Bear in mind that the medical wing of Hopkins had suffered a significant public and community relations setback when the Henrietta Lacks case came to light (Skloot 2010). .

[48] An important exception is the edited collection by Hula and Jackson-Elmoore (2000). See also Marwell (2007) and works on the black church: Owens (2007) and Tucker-Worgs (2011).

[49] Putting this in national context is an important book by John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (1983).

[50] Even here I am struck by the sparseness of examples of policy activity. While Katz and Bradley are eloquent in championing regional action, the indications of a metropolitan revolution are on the thin side. Except for modest cooperation around regional transportation, Baltimore, for instance, is not an area in which a regional force is much in evidence. As a region. nearby Washington, DC, is hampered by its multistate character. In other areas, even as city-suburb disparities diminish, suburb-suburb differences often pose another obstacle. As Katz and Bradley show, there are instances of regional action but a "metropolitan revolution" appears far off—especially in the absence of substantial federal support.

[51] On the full range of challenges facing community organizing, see Orr (2007).

[52] Writing about Baltimore in the era of Mayor Schaefer, Matthew Crenson quotes a community activist, saying of the city's politicians they "don't do anything to teach people how to be citizens. They teach them how to be consumers. You want something, you go to the organization … But you're not a citizen. You don't know how to do it." Crenson elaborates on the significance of this quote, saying that local politicians "stifled the development of life of political life in Canton [a Baltimore neighborhood] not only because they discouraged local residents from representing themselves at City Hall but because they undermined the self-reliance that might have led their constituents to manufacture their own unofficial public services" (1983, 258). Marwell(2007) examines variations in how community organizations engage residents and relate them to the larger world.

[53] A factor that I have not emphasized here is the matter of intra-stratum conflict between racial and ethnic groups. On the potential importance of this factor, see Marwell (2007) and Hyra (2012).